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Hedge Fund Governance
Houman B. Shadabt
This Article provides the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the inter-
nal governance of hedge funds. Hedge fund governance consists of the funds' under-
lying legal regime and the practices they adopt in response to lacking permanent
capital and to reduce agency costs. Hedge fund governance is important because bet-
ter governance can improve investor returns and help managers raise and retain
capital. I argue that hedge fund governance is best understood as a type of respon-
sive managerialism. It is a type of managerialism because applicable law and con-
tracting structures give managers uniquely wide-ranging control over the fund and
its operations. Hedge fund governance is also uniquely responsive, however, because
managers must continually satisfy investors, due to their ability to shut down a fund
by withdrawing their capital.
In addition to their underlying legal regime, the primary components of
hedge fund governance are investors with a strong propensity to exercise their short-
term redemption rights, managers with high pay-performance sensitivity, investor
demand for quality governance, and close monitoring by short-term creditors and
derivatives counterparties. On balance, hedge fund governance devices seem to pre-
vent managers from pursuing their own interests at the expense of investors. None-
theless, there is still plenty of room for hedge fund governance to improve. Accord-
ingly, this Article provides a normative framework and principles for improving
hedge fund governance by striking a better balance between governance devices that
are investor-friendly and those that empower managers. My analysis suggests that
the areas in which hedge fund governance needs the most improvement are perfor-
mance reporting (valuation) and the timing of performance-fee calculations. Im-
portantly, my analysis also suggests that investors may benefit from less disclosure,
higher fees, and less access to their capital.
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Hedge Fund Governance
Introduction
Concerns about the internal governance of hedge funds have dramatically in-
creased in recent years.' During the financial crisis of 2008, investors became frus-
trated when numerous hedge fund managers suddenly prevented them from with-
drawing their capital yet nonetheless continued to charge them fees. 2 Since the finan-
financial crisis, concerns about hedge fund governance have centered on transparency,
operational practices, and the growing view that fund directors do not effectively
monitor fund managers. Exemplifying these governance concerns was the June 2012
enforcement action by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
against the prominent hedge fund manager Phillip Falcone. The SEC alleged that
Falcone misappropriated investor assets and granted favorable treatment to some in-
vestors without the knowledge of the fund's directors or other investors. As a result
of such developments, major institutions are increasingly refusing to invest in hedge
funds that fail to meet their governance standards.
If hedge fund governance is not improved, investors may miss out on higher
returns or suffer undue losses. Improved governance can also help managers raise
and retain capital.4 Due to disappointing hedge fund returns in the years following the
financial crisis,' the new focus on governance, combined with an increasing number
A hedge fund is a private investment vehicle that is not subject to the full range of restrictions on
investment activities, disclosure obligations, and other regulations imposed by federal law on investment
companies, that compensates management in part with a fee based on annual profits, and that typically
engages in the active trading of financial instruments. Hedge funds are enabled by their underlying legal
regime to use the trifecta of leverage, short sales, and derivatives in pursuit of an extremely wide variety
of investment strategies. These strategies include investing in stocks and bonds, trading off of global
interest rate and currency fluctuations, purchasing illiquid assets, such as distressed debt, and making
asset-based loans. See Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds, 6 BERKELEY Bus.
L.J. 240, 241 (2009). Hedge funds globally managed an estimated $2.19 trillion in assets as of the third
quarter of 2012. ALEXANDER INEICHEN, ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, AIMA's ROADMAP TO HEDGE FUNDS
17, (12th ed. 2012).
2 CASEY QUIRK & BANK OF N.Y. MELLON, THE HEDGE FUND OF TOMORROW: BUILDING AN
ENDURING FIRM 11 (2009); Adam L. Aiken et al., Discretionary Liquidity: Hedge Funds, Side Pockets,
and Gates 2 (Nov, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://warrington.ufl.edu/departments/fire/docs/seminar/2013SpringChrisClifford.pdf.
Press Release, SEC, Philip A. Falcone and Harbinger Charged with Securities Fraud (June 27,
2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-122.htm.
4 See ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, A GUIDE TO INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS' VIEWS AND PREFERENCES
REGARDING HEDGE FUND OPERATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURES 7 (2011) ("Governance has become a 'make
or break' area in the investment decision-making process."); ANASTASIA DONDE, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR'S ALPHA, THE HEDGE FUND REPORT CARD 2 (2013) ("[S]imply posting high returns is no
longer enough to keep [hedge fund] investors happy.").
SEI, SIX WAYS HEDGE FUNDS NEED TO ADAPT NOw 23 (2013), available at
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of hedge funds competing for capital,6 has resulted in bargaining power over fees and
other governance devices permanently shifting in favor of investors.
This Article provides the first comprehensive scholarly analysis of the inter-
nal governance of hedge funds.7 In doing so, this Article makes several contributions.
First, this Article contributes to the literature on corporate governance by conceptual-
izing the unique way in which hedge funds are governed and situating their style of
governance within established paradigms. I argue that hedge fund governance is a
type of responsive managerialism. In general, managerialism is a descriptive theory
of corporate governance referring to control of a business enterprise resting in the
hands of managers, with equity holders and directors playing a passive role.8 Mana-
gerialism is widely rejected as a descriptive account of public corporations by schol-
http://www.seic.com/docs/IMS/SEI-HF-Paper-6-Ways-to-AdaptUS.pdf; Ellen Kelleher, Hedge Funds
Must Make 'Evolutionary Leap', FIN. TIMES (Mar. 24, 20130, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8f873208-
92d3-1 1 e2-9593-00144feabdcO.html.
6 MANAGED FUNDS Ass'N, HEDGE FUNDS: TRENDS AND INSIGHT FROM THE INDUSTRY AND INVESTORS
4 (2012), available at https://www.managedfunds.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/MFA HedgeFundsTrends and Insightl.pdf (displaying historic growth in
number of hedge funds from 1990 through the first quarter of 2012); Hedge Fund Numbers, Assets Hit
Record, FINALTERNATIVES (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/22347.
7 This Article focuses on hedge funds managed in or from the United States. Legal scholarship has
yet to focus on hedge fund governance. To date, the most governance-oriented work is an article by
Wulf A. Kaal that discusses hedge fund manager compensation and conflicts of interest in the context of
valuation issues. See generally Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and In-
vestor Suitability, 28 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 581 (2009). When legal scholarship focuses on
hedge funds and governance, it focuses on the impact that hedge funds have on the governance of other
companies as activist shareholders or bondholders. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and
Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375 (2007); Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, Past, Present, and
Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51 (2011); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey
N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Govern-
ance Rights, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206391; Robert
C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional In-
vestor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 231-32 (2007); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund
Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 281 (2009). Legal scholarship
also focuses on the regulatory aspects of hedge funds. See, e.g., Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager
Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-2150377; Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation,
and the Hedge Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2011); Cary Martin, Is Systemic Risk Prevention the
New Paradigm? A Proposal to Expand Investor Protection Principles to the Hedge Fund Industry, 86
St. JOHN'S L. REV. 87 (2012); Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J.
1 (2006); Houman B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail
Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 251(2008); J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost
Capital: Hedge Fund Regulation, Part II, a Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 799 (2007).
8 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 9 (2008).
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ars, who correctly argue that directors have ultimate control over managers and other
constituencies.9
I argue that in hedge fund context, by contrast, managerialism does provide
substantial descriptive value. Hedge fund governance is a form of managerialism be-
cause the funds' underlying legal regime gives managers near complete authority
over the structure and operations of the funds they manage. Hedge fund managerial-
ism arises from the fact that hedge funds are organized as privately held limited part-
nerships (or their functional equivalents) that highly circumscribe equity investors'
rights, issuing shares that have neither voting rights nor any mechanism to replace
managers or directors. Hedge fund managerialism gives hedge fund managers more
control and authority over their firms than managers of public companies, mutual
funds, or other private investment funds (e.g., private equity).
However, hedge fund governance is also uniquely responsive in the sense
that to obtain and retain investor capital, hedge fund managers must be highly re-
sponsive to the preferences of equity investors (the limited partners). This respon-
siveness arises from a fundamental dynamic of hedge fund governance - the pro-
pensity of investors to "pull the plug" and cash out of a fund if they are dissatisfied.10
Although hedge fund investors usually face short-term redemption restrictions," they
typically can disrupt the operations of a fund, or even cause it to wind down in a few
months to a year, by withdrawing their capital.12 Indeed, even if a hedge fund is per-
forming very well, potential governance problems may still cause the fund to become
concerned about its survival. For example, in January 2013, the highly successful
hedge fund SAC Capital reportedly had to "persuade investors to keep their money at
9 Id. at 10 ("Neither shareholders nor managers control corporations."); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290-292 (1999). But see
George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J. CORP. L. 39, 42-45
(2005).
10 See Itzak Ben-David et al., Hedge Fund Stock Trading in the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 5 (July
2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://fisher.osu.edu/blogs/efa2Ol 1/files/APE_2_3.pdf (finding that
"relative to mutual funds, [hedge fund investor] sensitivity to negative past performance is three times as
large"); infra note 159 and accompanying text. Pressure from hedge fund creditors may also cause a col-
lapse. See JPMORGAN ALT. ASSET MGMT., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE AND COUNTERPARTY
NEGOTIATIONS 15 (2008).
" See infra Part I.A.2.
12 See Harriet Agnew, More Hedge Funds Shut Down, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2012); Katherine Bur-
ton & Saijel Kishan, Longacre to Close Some Funds After Redemption Requests, BLOOMBERG Bus. WK.
(Oct. 11, 2011); Steve Eder, Hedge Funds Face Investor Pruning, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2011); Richard
Meryn, Hedge Fund Diamondback Winds Down as Clients Withdraw Money, INDUSTRY LEADERS MAG.
(Dec. 7, 2012).
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the fund" in response to an ongoing insider trading investigation that, at the time, had
only implicated certain employees but not the firm itself or its manager.
The uniqueness of hedge fund governance stems from the fact that the exit
rights of hedge fund investors put hedge fund managers on a much shorter leash than
managers of public corporations and other types of investment funds. Corporate
scholars recognize that an essential feature of the corporate form is that it permits a
firm to have access to permanent, "locked-in" capital from equity investors. 14 Private
equity and venture capital funds likewise have access to long-term capital because
investors in such funds are contractually bound to them for seven to ten years.I5
Managers with access to permanent or long-term capital do not have to be concerned
about investors suddenly pulling the rug out from beneath them and causing their
firms to shut down. Hedge fund managers do not have that luxury.1 6
In accordance with Larry Ribstein's seminal theory of business organizations,
hedge funds adopt a unique set of "uncorporate" governance devices.17 In addition to
13 Peter Lattman, Beneath the Calm, SAC Works to Contain Fallout from Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Jan. 27, 2013).
14 See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organiz-
ers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REv. 387 (2003); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman,
The Essential Role of Organizational Law, I10 YALE L.J. 387 (2000). Hedge funds do not use the gov-
ernance devices of public corporations, which include not only independent boards, the shareholder vot-
ing franchise, and non-waivable fiduciary duties but also a right of exit by selling shares in liquid stock
markets.
15 Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9 (2012); Bob Zider,
How Venture Capital Works, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 131, 1137; A Fund By Any Other
Name: The Convergence of Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, PRIVATE EQuITY NEWSL. (Davis
Polk & Wardwell) May 2006 at 1.
16 To obtain permanent capital, some hedge funds have even gone so far as to establish reinsurance
companies. Houman B. Shadab, Permanent Hedge Fund Capital Through Reinsurance, LAWBITRAGE
(Sept. 10, 2011, 10:10 AM), http://lawbitrage.typepad.com/blog/2011/09/permanent-hedge-fund-capital-
through-renisurance.html.
17 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 1-2, 38 (2010). See also Joseph A. McCa-
hery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, How Should We Regulate Private Equity and Hedge Funds?, MAB, July-
Aug. 2007 at 344, 348 ("One of the central features of the governance environment of [private equity
and hedge] funds is the limited partnership structure . . . . Its popularity is due to its contractual nature
which allows the internal and external participants to reduce opportunism and agency costs."), available
at http://www.mab-online.nl/pdf/599/McCaheryVermeulen.pdf. Hedge funds do share a fundamental
similarity with mutual funds in that mutual funds are also subject to short-term redemptions. Hedge fund
governance is nonetheless unique because mutual funds do not face the same level of ongoing collapse-
risk as hedge funds, as hedge fund investors are more sophisticated and preemptively remove funds to
avoid redemption restrictions. See Ben-David et al., supra note 10, at 3-6; William A. Birdthistle, In-
vestment Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. Ill. L. REv. 61,
73-85 (2010) (discussing weaknesses in the ability of mutual fund investor exit rights to discipline man-
agers). Mutual funds are also subject to a strict regime of federal regulation that makes the types of gov-
ernance devices they must and may adopt very different from that of hedge funds.
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their underlying legal regime, I argue that the primary components of hedge fund
governance consist of.
* investors with a high propensity to exercise their short-term redemption
rights;
* managers with high pay-performance sensitivity, due to being compen-
sated with an annual performance-based fee and their own investment in
the funds they manage;
* sophisticated investors demanding quality governance; and
* short-term creditors and derivatives counterparties providing close moni-
toring.
The hedge fund governance regime is also notable for what it lacks. Not only
do hedge funds lack permanent or long-term capital but hedge fund managers are also
not subject to stringent board oversight, removal by investors, or any market for cor-
porate control.' 8 Unlike private equity and venture capital funds, hedge funds are not
organized as "closed-end" funds for a finite (e.g., ten year) duration and, hence, are
not subject to the discipline of being required to return capital to investors at the end
of a specified investment lifecycle. 19
The governance regime that results from the interplay of hedge fund manage-
rialism and investor responsiveness may benefit investors by providing them with
sufficient transparency and liquidity and by empowering managers to successfully
pursue their investment strategies. On the other hand, hedge fund governance may
permit managers to impose agency costs on investors in the form of fraud, perfor-
mance manipulation, misaligned compensation incentives, and redemption re-
strictions that unnecessarily keep investor capital locked inside a fund. Hedge fund
governance thus consists of the funds' underlying legal regime and the practices they
adopt in response to lacking permanent capital and to reduce agency costs.
The second primary contribution of this Article is to examine and assess
hedge fund agency costs and the governance mechanisms used to reduce them. Alt-
hough financial economists have studied numerous discrete aspects of hedge fund
governance, this Article is the first to integrate their findings to provide a general as-
18 See Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of Compensation in the US. Venture Capital
Partnership, 51 J. FIN. EcON. 3, 4 (1999) (noting that "[ilnvestors in venture [capital] funds, the limited
partners, cannot utilize many of the methods of disciplining managers found in corporations, such as
dismissal, the active involvement of boards of directors, and the market for corporate control").
19 Structural Distinctions Between Private Equity and Hedge Funds, INv. LAW GRP,
http://www.investmentlawgroup.com/structural-distinctions-between-private-equity-funds-and-hedge-
funds (last visited Jan. 165, 2014).
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sessment of the relative significance of hedge fund agency costs. 20 Overall, it seems
that hedge fund managers are not systematically ripping off investors. This is because
empirical studies do not find that fraud or other types of agency costs are pervasive or
significant.2 1 In addition, empirical studies strongly suggest that hedge funds outper-
form stock and bond markets on a risk-adjusted basis even after managers are paid
their fees. 22 In other words, the market for hedge fund managers seems relatively
competitive and well-priced.23
Thus, in contrast to the argument that investor exit rights in mutual funds un-
dermine good governance (made in the Yale Law Journal by John Morley and Quinn
Curtis), 24 I view the exit rights of hedge fund investors as the primary reason why
hedge fund agency costs are low. And in contrast to prominent commentators, such
as Simon Lack, who argue that the benefits of investing in hedge funds are a "mi-
rage," 25 this Article undermines the view that the overwhelming majority of hedge
fund investors would be better off investing elsewhere.26
20 A related governance and agency cost literature exists in the study of private equity firms and
venture capital funds. See Harry Cendrowski & Adam Wadecki, The Private Equity Governance Model,
in PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS 117 (2d ed. 2012); Douglas Cumming,
Grant Flemming & Armin Schwienbacher, The Structure of Venture Capital Funds, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH ON VENTURE CAPITAL 155-176 (2007); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Govern-
ance of Venture Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. EcoN. 473 (1990). Although industry analysis is in-
creasingly focusing on hedge fund governance, its value is limited because it is typically not informed
by academic research.
21 See infra Part II.
22 See infra Part IlI.D.
23 Whether and to what extent the market for mutual fund managers is competitive is a subject of
substantial debate and attention. See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why
Governance and Fee Litigation Don't Work in Mutual Funds, 120 Yale L.J. 84, 98-100 (2010).
24 See id. at 84 (arguing that "the net effect of exit on many [mutual fund] investors is ambiguous,
because investors who do not use their rights to leave underperforming funds cannot expect activism by
other investors to improve the funds").
25 See generally SIMON LACK, THE HEDGE FUND MIRAGE (2012) (arguing that hedge funds signifi-
cantly underperform risk-free U.S. treasury bonds and that the overwhelming majority of hedge fund
profits go to managers).
26 While much of Lack's analysis and recommendations are sound, his approach to measuring hedge
fund returns and how hedge fund managers and investors share profits is fundamentally flawed. The
most important errors of Lack's analysis are basic mathematical errors, using flawed indices to estimate
average returns, overgeneralizing based upon the performance of the "average" hedge fund, and confus-
ing gross manager profits with net profits. See CTR. FOR HEDGE FUND RESEARCH, THE VALUE OF THE
HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY TO INVESTORS, MARKETS, AND THE BROADER ECONOMY 5 (2012) ("hedge fund
investors earn around 72 percent of the profits, while the managers' proportion is significantly lower
being 28 percent of total returns"); Robert G. Ibbotson & Peng Chen, Sources of Hedge Fund Returns:
Alphas, Betas, and Costs 2 (Yale Int'l Ctr. Fin., Working Paper No. 05-17, 2005), available at
http://www.hedgeindex.com/hedgeindex/documents/sourceofhedgefundreturns.pdf ("[E]xcess returns
were almost equally shared between hedge fund managers and their investors." ); Andrew Beer, A Lack
of Rigor in the Hedge Fund Mirage, ALLABOUTALPHA.COM (Nov. 15, 2012), allaboutal-
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Nonetheless, hedge fund governance still has plenty of room for improve-
ment. The third contribution of this Article is to provide hedge fund investors and
managers with a normative framework and principles to improve hedge fund govern-
ance. In doing so, this Article follows the tradition of legal scholarship pioneered by
Harvard Law School professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried. That tradition es-
tablishes principles for investors to consider when making decisions about financial
contracting in the organizational context, with public company compensation ar-
rangements serving as the focus of Bebchuk and Fried's work.27
In the hedge fund context, my analysis suggests that the areas in which hedge
fund governance needs the most improvement are performance reporting (valuation)
and the timing of performance-fee calculations. I also argue, however, that investors
should be careful of what they wish for when choosing or negotiating governance
structures. Although investors generally benefit from low fees and significant trans-
parency and liquidity, if investor-friendly governance devices are improperly struc-
tured or taken too far, investors run the risk of undermining the unique performance-
based incentives and other governance mechanisms that enable hedge funds to pro-
duce superior returns in the first place. Importantly, investors may benefit from less
disclosure, higher fees, and less access to their capital.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines hedge fund managerialism
and its legal origins. Part II discusses the most important hedge fund agency costs,
and Part III details important hedge fund governance devices. Part IV contains my
framework and principles for improving hedge fund governance. The final Part of
this Article concludes.
pha.com/blog/2012/1l/15/a-lack-of-rigor-in-the-hedge-fund-mirage/; Aaron Brown, Are Hedge Funds
Worthwhile Investments?, MINYANVILLE (Feb. 1, 2012),
http://www.minyanville.com/businessmarkets/articles/hedge-funds-what-are-hedge-
funds/2/l/2012/id/39152; Christopher Faille, A Fresh Look at Track Records and Risk,
ALLABOUTALPHA.COM (Nov. 29, 2012), allaboutalpha.com/blog/2012/11/29/a-fresh-look-at-track-
records-and-risk/; Thomas Schneeweis & Hossein Kazemi, An Academic Response to the "Hedge Fund
Mirage" (Sept. 30, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2228851; Aa-
ron Brown, Customer Review, AMAZON (JAN. 12, 2012),
http://www.amazon.com/review/RI 9QAFVYCJM5PO/ref-cm crprperm?ie=UTF8&ASIN=l 1181643
18&linkCode=&nodelD=&tag-; Gaetan Lion, Customer Review, AMAZON (April 19, 2012),
http://www.amazon.com/review/R3MZ4RXOBJY3W3/ref-cm cr_pr_perm?ie=UTF8&ASIN= 1118.
27 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1915, 1922 (2010).
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I. Managerialism
A "hedge fund" consists of three basic entities: the fund itself, the fund's
management company, and the fund's equity investors. Organizing the fund either as
a U.S. limited partnership or offshore corporation affords the hedge fund manager
overwhelming flexibility in managing its operational practices and carrying out its
investment strategy. The general partner of a hedge fund limited partnership is re-
sponsible for managing all aspects of the fund's business, including its investment
portfolio. 2 8 The hedge fund legal regime is best understood as a regime of manageri-
alism due to the wide ranging discretion that applicable law and organizational struc-
tures give to managers. My analysis reveals that hedge fund managers have a greater
level of control and authority than that of corporate managers and managers of most
other of types of investment funds.
A. Hedge Fund Limited Partnerships
1. Governance of the Management Company
The general partner of a hedge fund limited partnership is the fund's portfo-
lio manager and investment adviser. The general partner bears unlimited liability for
any debts the partnership itself cannot satisfy.2 9 Accordingly, the general partner of a
hedge fund is organized as a limited liability entity to prevent the manager from be-
ing subject to personal liability for the fund's debts. 30
The general partner, or management company, is governed by its operating
agreement, which determines, among other issues, how the manager's profits and
losses are allocated, partner capital contributions, and terms of withdrawal or expul-
sion.31 The hedge fund management company's operating agreement and company
28 DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., SHARTSIS FRIESE LLP, U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 89, 94
(2005). For the purposes of this Article, the phrases hedge fund "manager" and "investment adviser" are
used interchangeably to refer to the same business entity.
29 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-403 (West 2012); HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 92.
30 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 88 n.4, 91-92. As control persons of the general-partner entity,
its owners may be personally liable for actions of the general partner as manager of the fund. Id. at 92.
Organizing the fund as a limited partnership, and the general partner as a limited-liability entity, is cru-
cial to the fund, its investors, and the manager in minimizing tax burdens. As a limited partnership and
limited liability company (LLC), respectively, neither the fund nor the general partner-manager would
be taxed at the entity level. All income, gains, losses, and deductions "pass through" to the general and
limited partners, who report such items on their personal income tax returns. Id. at 88-89, 92.
31 Id. at 93-94; NAVENDU P. VASAVADA, TAXATION OF U.S. INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND HEDGE
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policies and practices must determine who may act for the manager and the extent to
which owner approval may be required. 32 In practice, hedge fund management com-
panies typically establish a senior management structure that includes a chief execu-
tive officer, chief financial officer, chief compliance officer, and committees that
oversee risk and valuation.3 ' Hedge fund management companies typically do not
have an independent board of directors or equivalent supervisory body.
Fiduciary duties imposed on the management company stem from two
sources. First, as investment advisers, federal law imposes fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care on hedge fund management companies to the funds they advise but general-
ly not to the fund's own investors. 34 These duties include providing independent in-
vestment advice that is suitable for the fund, putting the fund's interests above the
adviser's own, and disclosing any potential conflicts of interest between the adviser
and the fund including the general nature of any preferential treatment to some inves-
tors." Second, state-level limited partnership law typically imposes default fiduciary
duties upon managers.3 6 Although fiduciary duties are generally viewed as contractu-
al in nature and may be eliminated entirely in the fund's operating agreement, 37 in
practice, hedge funds typically do not entirely eliminate the fiduciary duties the man-
agement company (general partner) owes to the limited partners.38 When fiduciary
FUNDS: ACCOUNTING POLICIES, TAX ALLOCATIONS, AND PERFORMANCE PRESENTATION 7 (2010).
32 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 93.
3 ASSET MANAGERS' COMM. TO PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., BEST PRACTICES FOR
THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 14, 24, 50 (2009), available at
http://www.amaicmte.org/Public/AMC%20Report%20-%2OFinal.pdf
4 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963); SEC, STUDY ON
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 22 (2011). Only under limited circumstances have hedge
fund managers been found to owe a duty to investors directly. United States v Lay, 612 F.3d 440, 445
(6th Cir. 2010); Retirement Program for Employees of Fairfield v. Madoff, No. X05CV0950115618,
2010 WL 2106654 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2010).
3 SEC, supra note 34, at 22-28.
36 See Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, No. 5502-CS, 2011 WL 3505355, at
*31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011) ("As a matter of default law, Paige General Partner clearly owes fiduciary
duties to the limited partners in the Hedge Fund."). See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, The Fiduciary Obli-
gations of Financial Advisors Under the Law ofAgency (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 13-16,
2013), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2234830. By contrast, whether managers of limited liability
companies owe default fiduciary duties to members is not clear. See Gatz Properties LLC v. Auriga Cap-
ital Corp., 59 A.3d 1206, 1218 (Del. 2012).
3 For example, Delaware's limited partnership statute seeks "to give maximum effect to the princi-
ple of freedom of contract" by permitting the partnership agreement to eliminate the fiduciary duties of
general partners to limited partners. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1 101(c)-(d) (West 2012). The equiva-
lent provisions allowing statutory waiver for the member of an LLC are located in section 18-1101(b)-
(e).
3 See Paige Capital Mgmt., 2011 WL 3505355, at *1 (noting that the partnership agreement provid-
ed an investor with the right of withdrawal if the manager breaches a fiduciary duty). An empirical study
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duties are so eliminated, investors' claims against the manager are limited to breach
of the limited partnership agreement or violation of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.3 9
Under the terms of the manager's agreement with the fund it advises, the
management company is compensated in part by a management fee. The manage-
ment fee ranges from 1% to 2% of the fund's net asset value and is calculated month-
ly or quarterly.40 The management fee generally covers expenses for operating and
administering the fund - such as for overhead, personnel salary, office leases, and
physical capital costs. 4 1 The manager is also compensated with a performance fee av-
eraging approximately 18% of the annual profits of the fund.42
2. Limited Investor Rights
Under limited partnership law, the hedge fund manager (general partner) has
the exclusive right to manage the company,43 except with respect to a few extraordi-
nary issues." In addition, a hedge fund's limited partnership operating agreement
contractually defines the rights and duties between the fund manager and the limited
partner investors. The agreement empowers the management company with wide-
ranging authority to manage all aspects of the hedge fund's business, including its in-
vestment portfolio. 45
of publicly traded limited partnerships and limited liability companies did find, however, that an over-
whelming majority either eliminated fiduciary duties or waived manager liability arising from their
breach. Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from
Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 574 (2012).
39See Lonergan v. EPE Holdings, LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1017 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting that plaintiff's
"complaint frames each of these theories using the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing be-
cause the .. . LP Agreement eliminates default fiduciary duties").
40 PREQIN, HEDGE FUNDS: THE FEE DEBATE, AN END TO "2 & 20"? 1 (2010), available at
http://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/Preqin_HF_T&CApril_201 0.pdfprid=24.
41 SAM KIRSCHNER ET AL., THE INVESTOR'S GUIDE TO HEDGE FUNDS 307-308 (2006). See also What
Expenses Does a Hedge Fund Pay For?, HEDGE FUND L. BLOG (Aug. 17, 2008),
http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com/what-expenses-does-a-hedge-fund-pay-for.html.
42 See infra Part III.B. For a more detailed explanation of hedge fund employee compensation struc-
tures see GLOCAP SEARCH, INC. & HEDGE FUND RESEARCH, INC., 2011 GLOCAP HEDGE FUND
COMPENSATION REPORT.
43 UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 406(a) (2001).
4 These extraordinary matters over which limited partners have consent rights include amending the
partnership agreement and sale of at least substantially all of the partnership's assets outside the ordinary
course of business. § 406(b).
45 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28.
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The limited partners provide capital as the fund's equity investors.46 Limited
partner investors are not liable for the fund's debts, although they are subject to los-
ing all of their investment capital and any undistributed profits.4 7 To avoid losing
their limited liability and interfering with managerial control, hedge fund limited
partners do not participate in investment decisions, and the fund operating agreement
does not empower them to do so. 4 8 Although limited partnership statutes permit a
partnership agreement to grant voting rights to limited partners, 49 hedge fund limited
partnerships do not typically grant limited partners any voting rights or the ability to
nominate directors.50 The hedge fund management company directly or indirectly
owns all of the fund's voting shares in a separate class with no economic rights.5 '
Hedge fund investors thus do not have the right to vote for, or ultimately remove,
management, which is inherent in corporate shares and typically available to share-
holders in other types of investment funds.52 The limited partners of a hedge fund are
46 See, e.g., Allen v. Amber Manor Apartments P'ship, 420 N.E.2d 440, 495 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(holding that limited partnership status is obtained by making a capital contribution).
47 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303 (West 2012). Hedge funds typically only accept capital
contributions at the beginning of each month and may close themselves off to new contributions if man-
agers determine that additional capital may undermine their ability to carry out their investment strate-
gies.
48 See id. § 17-303(a).
49 See, e.g., id. § 17-302(b) ("[T]he partnership agreement may grant to all or certain identified lim-
ited partners o a specified class or group of limited the partners the right to vote separately or with all or
any call or group of the limited partners or the general partners, on any matter.").
50 MANAGED FUNDS Ass'N, SOUND PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND MANAGERS 11 (2009). Partnership
statutes expressly allow for a partnership agreement to completely eliminate any voting powers of lim-
ited partners. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-302(f) ("A partnership agreement may provide that
any limited partner or class or group of limited partners shall have no voting rights."). Those hedge fund
investors that hold voting shares will be able to vote on material events such as "the appointment and
removal of the investment manager; the election of directors; approval of directors' fees; variation of
shareholder rights; or a winding up of the fund at annual or extraordinary general meetings." ALT. INV.
MGMT. Ass'N, supra note 4, at 8.
s1 See ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, supra note 4, at 8; JAMES D. SPELLMAN, COAL. OF PRIVATE INV. COS.,
HEDGE FUNDS: How THEY SERVE INVESTORS IN U.S. AND GLOBAL MARKETS 10 (2009), available at
http://www.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Hedge Funds.pdf.
52 See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (2012) (providing for mutu-
al fund shareholders to elect the fund's board of directors); PHYLLIS A. SCHWARTZ & STEPHANIE R.
BRESLOW, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: FORMATION AND OPERATION, § 2:1.7, 2-10 (2012) (noting that a main
objective of private equity fund investors is to negotiate "an escape hatch from unsatisfactory manage-
ment through use of for-cause (and in some cases also no-fault) general partner removal clauses");
Sahlman, supra note 20, at 490; Jamie Sklar, Schulte Partner Stephanie Breslow Discusses Hedge Fund
Liquidity Management Tools in Practising Law Institute Seminar, 5 HEDGE FUND L. REP., no. 43, Nov.
15, 2008, at 7 ("In contrast to private equity fund investors, hedge fund investors have not, in the majori-
ty of cases, pushed for the contractual right to remove the fund manager.").
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extremely passive investors, whose decision making is limited to deciding when and
how much capital to contribute or redeem.
Hedge funds also place significant short-term restrictions on investors' abil-
ity to redeem their capital and to resell or otherwise transfer their shares.54 A fund
operating agreement typically restricts investors' ability to withdraw capital to a peri-
odic basis, such as monthly, quarterly, or semi-annually, 5 and may permit the man-
ager to completely bar withdrawals at its discretion. 56 In addition, investors must typ-
ically give thirty to ninety days' notice before withdrawing capital. 57 Hedge funds
may also implement an initial lockup period that prohibits the withdrawal of a capital
contribution after it is first invested in the fund.58 Lockup periods range from less
than one quarter to one year.59 A 2012 industry study found the average hedge fund
redemption period to be thirty-five days and the average lockup period to be 5.85
months. 60 Hedge funds may also use a contractual provision known as a "gate" to
limit how much capital can be withdrawn on a given date. Gates usually limit inves-
tor redemptions to 10% to 25% of the value of the fund, but they may also (or in the
alternative) limit redemptions to a portion of the investor's own capital. 6 1 Hedge
funds may also segregate a portion of an investor's capital into an illiquid "side
pocket" that prevents the investor from withdrawing its capital until the manager ac-
tually exits the investment.62
5 MANAGED FUNDS Ass'N, supra note 50; Bruce N. Lehmann, Corporate Governance and Hedge
Fund Management, FED. Res. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., 4th Quarter 2006, at 81, 86 ("[T]he limited
partners in hedge funds are glorified creditors, not active participants in the day-to-day operations of the
business.").
54 Share resale restrictions are generally required for a hedge fund to make a private offering under
federal law. See infra Part I.C.2. Hedge funds also place restrictions on the trading of their shares so as
to not be deemed a publicly traded partnership and to avoid its associated higher tax burden.
ss HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 3; Credit Hedge Funds Will Continue to Demand Appropriate
Liquidity Terms From Investors, SOBER LOOK (Jan. 19, 2013), http://soberlook.com/2013/01/credit-
hedge-funds-will-continue-to.html. By comparison, publicly registered mutual funds are required to re-
deem shares to investors daily. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e).
56 See FRANCOIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HANDBOOK ON HEDGE FUNDS 29 (2006).
5 MARK J.P. ANSON, HANDBOOK OF ALTERNATIVE ASSETS 125 (2008).
58 Id.
5 JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., MILKEN INST., HEDGE FUNDS: RISKS AND RETURNS IN GLOBAL CAPITAL
MARKETS 38-41 (2006) (finding that a majority of hedge funds have a lock-up period of less than one
quarter). Hedge funds may also use "soft" lockups that allow investors to redeem during their lockup
period by paying the fund a penalty fee for doing so. Credit Hedge Funds Will Continue to Demand Ap-
propriate Liquidity Terms from Investors, supra note 55.
60 Ross Ford et al., Liquidity, 4 HEDGE FUND SPOTLIGHT, Dec. 2012, at 2.
61 See generally David J. Lestz, Gates, A Primer, 5 BLOOMBERG L. REP., nos. 34 & 35, 2011.62 Steven J. Tsimbinos & Scott H. Moss, Using Side Pockets for Illiquid and Hard to Value Securi-
ties, MFA REPORTER, May/June 2005, at 1, 1-2.
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Limiting the ability of investors to withdraw capital is the primary hedge
fund governance device that arises in response to investors' ability and propensity to
withdraw their funds. Redemption restrictions empower managers because redemp-
tions may interfere with the manager's investment strategy, destabilize the fund's li-
quidity, or otherwise disrupt the fund's operations. 63 Fiduciary principles, however,
may limit the ability to exercise discretionary redemption restrictions. For example, a
fund manager's refusal to permit investors to withdraw capital pursuant to a contrac-
tually negotiated gate may violate its fiduciary duty of loyalty if done solely to earn
additional fees and not protect the fund or other investors. 64
B. Hedge Fund Corporations
1. Offshore Funds
Two-thirds of hedge funds globally are organized outside of the United
States in an "offshore" jurisdiction, such as the Cayman Islands; and they are typical-
ly organized as corporations.6 5 U.S.-managed hedge funds are organized in offshore
jurisdictions primarily to appeal to non-U.S. investors seeking confidentiality, to
permit U.S. tax exempt investors (e.g., pensions and charitable organizations) to take
advantage of potentially beneficial tax treatment from investing offshore, and to af-
ford greater flexibility via exclusion from U.S. investment company regulation. 6 6
From a governance perspective, management companies enjoy the same gen-
eral plenary powers over offshore funds' investments and other operations as they do
with onshore funds. 67 However, in response to tax disadvantages and restrictions on
marketing, U.S.-based onshore funds impose significantly greater restrictions on in-
vestor redemptions, including longer lockups and redemption notice periods.
63 See infra Part II.B.2.
64 See Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, No. 5502-CS, 2011 WL 3505355,
at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011) ("The discretion granted to the hedge fund manager to determine whether
to waive the Gates is a fiduciary authority that must be used for the benefit of those whom the Hedge
Fund is intended to benefit, and not for the selfish interest of the manager.").
65 ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, supra note 4, at 21. For differences that may be relevant to U.S. and
Cayman Island hedge funds structured as limited partnerships, see Andrea L. Cohen, Differences Be-
tween Cayman Islands and Delaware Limited Partnerships, PRIVATE EQuITY NEWSL. (Nixon Peabody),
Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.nixonpeabody.com/118168.
66 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 99-101; Focus on Offshore Funds, HFMWEEK (June 9, 2011),
http://www.mourantozannes.com/media/455710/focus-on-offshorefunds.pdf.
67 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 104.
68 Bing Liang et al., Onshore and Offshore Hedge Funds: Are They Twins? 4 (Dec. 21, 2011) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2014402.
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2. Offshore Hedge Fund Directors
From a governance point of view, the most distinguishing aspect of offshore
hedge funds is that, unlike most of their U.S.-based peers, offshore hedge funds typi-
cally have a board of directors. 69 This is because offshore funds are typically orga-
nized as corporations (which must have boards as a matter of basic corporate law) or
are located in jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands, that require funds organized
in their jurisdiction to have boards.70 Offshore hedge funds also sometimes list their
shares on stock exchanges that mandate independent directors as part of their listing
requirements.7 '
At a high level, the duties of hedge fund directors are similar to those of pub-
lic company directors.72 Hedge fund directors have a duty to act in the best interests
of the fund without any conflicts. They must also independently "exercise reasonable
care, skill, and diligence" in furthering the fund's interests, which requires proactive
supervision and information gathering. This oversight role includes monitoring the
manager's investment performance and adherence to its investment policy, the fund's
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and disclosures to and treatment of
the fund's investors and overseeing third-party administrators responsible for prepar-
ing financial statements and determining the fund's net asset value. In the 2011 deci-
sion in Weavering Macro Fixed Income Fund Limited v. Peterson, the Grand Court
of the Cayman Islands found two hedge fund directors liable to investors for abdicat-
ing their oversight role in deference to the interests of the fund manager. 73
In practice, the oversight role hedge fund directors play is likely not substan-
tial. This is because directors are appointed by managers (as opposed to investors),
typically sit on the boards of numerous funds, or lack the requisite financial expertise
6 RATAN ENGINEER & ARTHUR F. TULLY, ERNST & YOUNG, COMING OF AGE: GLOBAL HEDGE FUND
SURVEY 13 (2011) (noting that less than 15% of North American hedge funds have boards).70 See, e.g., WALKERS GLOBAL, WALKER, BVI, CAYMAN AND JERSEY HEDGE FUNDS 20 (2012) (The
Cayman Islands Monetary Authority "requires a minimum of 2 individual directors for registered
funds."); Jonathan Fitzgibbons, Cayman Islands: Starting a Cayman Islands Hedge Fund, MONDAQ
(May 9, 2012), http://www.mondaq.comi/x/131154/Banking/So+You+Want+To+Start+A+Hedge+Fund
(In the Cayman Islands "[t]ypical hedge funds will be regulated funds and must therefore comply with
the jCayman Islands] Mutual Funds Law provisions.").
"Mark Beames, The Role of Independent Directors in Offshore Hedge Funds, EUREKAHEDGE,(JuIy
2004), http://www.eurekahedge.com/news/04julyarchive-news-bearnes.asp.
72 See LHABITANT, supra note 56, at 91-92.
73 Judgment of Aug. 26, 2011, Weavering Macro Fixed Income Fund Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Peter-
son, Grand Court, Cayman Islands (Cause No. FSD 113 of 2010).
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or independence from fund managers to provide independent oversight. 74 And be-
cause hedge fund investors usually do not have voting shares, they do not have the
ability to replace directors.75 Accordingly, hedge fund boards do not provide the same
level of oversight and responsiveness to investors as do boards of public corpora-
tions.
C. Federal Law
In the United States, federal law indirectly impacts how hedge funds are gov-
erned by providing assurance to investors against fraud and by mandating certain dis-
closures and business conduct standards. The primary federal statutes that apply to
hedge funds are the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act),76 the Securities
Act of 1933 (Securities Act), 77 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act). Although hedge funds' investing and trading activities are subject to
the Investment Company Act of 1940,79 hedge funds limit their investor base by
number and wealth-qualifications so as to be exempt from its regulation.so The In-
74 See generally SOUND FUND ADVISORS, FUND GOVERNANCE AT A CROSSROADS: CURRENT
INDUSTRY DATA AND RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES 1 (2012) ("There are few external hedge fund di-
rectors with the requisite experience to effectively monitor changes in investment strategy or fund
risk."); Frances Denmark, Directors Wanted, ALPHA MAG., June 2008; Frances Denmark, Hedge Fund
Directors Still Veiled in Secrecy, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 3, 2011; Frances Denmark, Hedge
Fund Investors Doubt Director Support, ALPHA MAG., May 15, 2009; Press Release, Fundgov, SEC Fil-
ings: Hedge Funds Far Behind Mutual Funds in Governance Practices (Jan. 7, 2013) (finding that "100
individuals hold 5,000 of the 9,000 board positions . . . of 2,800 different hedge funds"), available at
http://fundgov.org/home/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Press-release-from-Foundation-for-Fund-
Governance-Jan-7-2013.pdf.
7s See generally M. Corey Goldman, Mutiny? Good Luck, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 24, 2009
(reporting that hedge fund boards typically are not involved in monitoring management and that "the
fine print in a hedge fund charter usually makes it almost impossible" for investors to replace directors
or otherwise influence management decisions); Frances Denmark, Hedge Fund Investors Doubt Direc-
tor Support, supra note 74 (noting that only in rare occasions can hedge fund investors replace direc-
tors); supra note 50 and accompanying text.
i6 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (2012).
n Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2012).
78 Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012).
7 Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (2012).
80 Hedge funds operate so as to qualify for at least one of two exclusions from the definition of an
investment company. Under section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act, hedge funds are excluded
from the definition of investment company so long as they have no more than 100 investors and sell
their securities only through a private sale. § 80a-3(c)(1). Under section 3(c)(7), hedge funds are exclud-
ed from the definition of investment company so long as they only sell securities to "qualified purchas-
ers" through a private sale. § 80a-3(c)(7). Nonpublic offerings for the purposes of being exempted from
the Act are generally interpreted to be the same as those as under section 4(2) of the Securities Act.
SEC, IMPLICATION OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 12 n.36 (2003) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT].
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vestment Company Act subjects regulated funds to wide-ranging and detailed regula-
tion,8' including substantial limitations on a fund's use of leverage and ability to en-
gage in short sales and derivatives transactions. 82
A hedge fund manager meets the Advisers Act's definition of an "investment
adviser," which is defined as any person in the business of advising others about
whether to purchase or sell certain securities.83 All U.S.-based hedge fund managers
must register under the Advisers Act, unless they fall within an exemption, such as
Qualified purchasers include both natural persons owning at least $5 million in investments and certain
companies with at least $100 million in securities investments. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i); 17 C.F.R. §
270.2a5 1-l (g)(2) (2005).
8 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(1); SEC, Form N-1A Items 3, 5, 10, 14-15 (requiring disclosure of in-
formation including contact information of the fund's investment advisers and portfolio managers, the
history of the fund, its risk/return profile and investment objectives, the fund's organization, and how the
fees it charges to investors are calculated). Registered investment companies must also quarterly dis-
close portfolio holdings to the SEC and semiannually to investors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(a)-(b), (e); 17
C.F.R. §§ 270.30bl-1, bl-5, c-I. Open-end registered investment companies must also daily calculate
net asset value and allow investors to redeem shares within seven days at that value. 15 U.S.C § 80a-
22(e); 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (requiring registered investment companies to sell, redeem, or repur-
chase shares at net asset value); 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c- 1(b) (requiring registered investment companies to
calculate net asset value at least daily).
82 For example, to use leverage in the form of borrowing bank funds, a registered investment compa-
ny must cover the debt by retaining assets equivalent to at least 300% of the borrowings. 15 U.S.C. §
80a-18(c) (debt restriction for closed-end investment companies);§ 80a-18(f) (debt restriction for open-
end investment companies). In addition, under the Act an investment company that engages in a short
sale or certain derivatives transactions must effectively hedge the investment position with an offsetting
trade or hold liquid securities of an equivalent value in a segregated account. See Audrey Talley &
James L. Love, Restrictions on Investments, in MUTUAL FUND REGULATION, §§ 3:3.1[B][3], 3.7-3.11
(Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 2d ed. 2007). Although the SEC has authority under section 12(a) to prohibit
registered investment companies from undertaking short sales or purchasing securities on the "margin"
(which is a form of borrowing), it has not exercised that authority. The Act also imposes additional re-
strictions on open-end investment companies available to retail investors, commonly known as "mutual
funds." Mutual funds are prohibited from investing greater than 15% of the net value of their assets in
illiquid securities, including the privately placed securities issued by hedge funds. Revisions of Guide-
lines to Form N-IA, Investment Company Act Release. No. 18,612, 57 Fed. Reg. 9828 (Mar. 12, 1992).
The SEC defines "illiquid" securities as those that cannot be sold at or near their net asset value within
seven days. Acquisition and Valuation of Certain Portfolio Instruments by Registered Investment Com-
panies, Investment Company Act Release No. 14,983, 51 Fed. Reg. 9,773 (Mar. 12, 1986); Statement
Regarding "Restricted Securities," Investment Company Act Rel. No. 5,947, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989 (Oct.
21, 1969). Mutual funds also may not utilize lock-ups because open-end investment companies must
return capital to investors within seven days of a redemption request. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e). In addition,
mutual funds holding themselves out as "diversified" funds are prohibited, with respect to 75% of their
assets, from holding more than 10% of the voting securities of any single issuer, or having the securities
of an issuer constitute more than 5% of the mutual fund's net asset value. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(b)(1). To
minimize their tax liability, mutual funds must also comply with the diversification rule of the Internal
Revenue Code, which requires mutual funds to meet the same diversification rule with respect to 50% of
its assets. See I.R.C. § 851(b)(3) (2012).
8 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1).
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advising funds with less than $150 million in assets under management or qualifying
as a foreign private adviser. 84 Hedge funds also raise capital privately, so as not to be
subject to the Securities Act's mandatory registration and disclosure obligations re-
quired of companies making a public offering of securities.8 5
1. Prohibitions Against Fraud
Registered and unregistered hedge fund managers are subject to the provi-
sions of the Advisers Act prohibiting material misstatements to, misleading omis-
sions to, and other fraudulent practices against investors or prospective investors.8 6
The Advisers Act prohibits any fund manager from making false or misleading
statements regarding investment strategies, experience and credentials, risks associat-
ed with the fund, or valuation of the fund's assets.
84 Advisers Act §§ 80b-3(b), 80b-3(l), 80b-3(m); Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds,
Private Fund Advisers with Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3111, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,190 (Nov. 19, 2010). Although
registered managers are prohibited from charging a performance fee to clients based solely upon the cli-
ent's capital gains (i.e., the fund's profits), a registered adviser may charge a profit-based performance
fee if advising a fund which is excluded from the Investment Company Act under section 3(c)(7), or if
all investors in the fund meet the definition of a "qualified client." 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (prohibiting a
registered adviser from being paid compensation "on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital
appreciation of the funds or any portion of the funds of the client"); § 80b-5(b)(4); 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-
3(d)(1). In addition, a registered adviser is permitted to charge a performance fee if the fee symmetrical-
ly increases or decreases in proportion to the performance of the fund averaged over a specified period
or relative to an external benchmark of performance. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(l)-(2). Symmetric perfor-
mance-based fees, also known as "fulcrum fees," are only utilized by approximately 2% of U.S. mutual
funds, in part due to accepted commercial practice, as well as the incentives fulcrum fees create for in-
vestors to exit early or to not join well-performing funds. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PENN. L. REv. 1021, 1050 (2006-2007);
Sophia Grene, A Cautious Embrace ofPerformance Fees, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008..
8 To qualify for a private offering, hedge funds generally limit their investor base almost exclu-
sively to accredited investors, which include institutions with at least $5,000,000 in assets and natural
persons whose net worth (or whose joint net worth with a spouse) exceeds $1,000,000 or that have an
annual income for the last two years of at least $200,000 (or $300,000 in joint spousal income). 17
C.F.R. § 230.501(a). The definition of accredited investor was amended on Dec. 21, 2011 to exclude an
investor's primary residence in the net worth calculation. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Net Worth
Standard for Accredited Investors Under Dodd-Frank Act (Dec. 21, 2011), available at
http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-274.htm. When an offering is made pursuant to the "safe harbor"
of Rule 506, the offering is deemed in accordance with section 4(2) and hence exempt from the registra-
tion requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act.
86 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-(8).
8 Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44756,
44759 (Aug. 9, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). See also SEC, supra note 34, at 29-32. Under
the Advisers Act, fraudulent or misleading statements or omissions need not be willful to be unlawful;
negligence is sufficient for liability. 72 Fed. Reg. at 44,759-60 (noting that negligent misstatements are
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In raising capital from limited partner-investors, hedge funds are subject to
the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.88 Under section
17(a) of the Securities Act, it is unlawful for any issuer to make an untrue statement
of material fact or to omit any fact so as to make a statement misleading.89 Under sec-
tion 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act, material omissions in connection
with the sale of any security are likewise prohibited. 90 Rule l0b-5-1 prohibits hedge
fund managers from using material nonpublic information to purchase or sell securi-
ties (insider trading).91 In addition, under various provisions of the Exchange Act and
Securities Act, hedge funds are prohibited from manipulating the prices of publicly or
privately held securities.9 2
2. Disclosure and Business Conduct Requirements
The Advisers Act requires registered hedge fund managers to electronically
file and keep current Form ADV with the SEC.93 All parts of Form ADV, except for
an investment brochure, must also be made available to the public on the Investment
Adviser Public Disclosure website.94 The brochure must be written in "plain English"
and be provided to prospective clients and annually to existing clients. 95 Part 1 of
Form ADV requires managers to disclose basic information relating to the firm and
its business, so as to assist regulators with oversight. Part 2 of Form ADV requires a
manager to disclose information relating to potential conflicts of interest and other
issues, including fees and how they are calculated, client referrals, disciplinary histo-
ry, and the manager's supervision of personnel.96 For the purposes of assisting regu-
latory authorities in preserving financial stability, registered hedge fund advisers with
prohibited under the Advisers Act).
88 Notwithstanding the fact that hedge funds privately raise capital in reliance upon Regulation D of
the Securities Act, such an offering is fully subject to the Act's antifraud provisions. Landreth Timber
Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 692 (1985); Regulation D Preliminary Note 1, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501.
89 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
90 15 U.S.C. § 78j; Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Furthermore, under the Securities Act mere
negligence is sufficient to be liable for fraud. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980).
91 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,559, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51737 (Aug. 24,
2000).
92 LARRY D. SODERQUIST, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS § 14:5 (4th ed. 2004).
9 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203.1, 275.204-1.
94 The Investment Adviser Public Disclosure website is located at http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov
(last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
9s SEC, supra note 34, at 18-20.
96 See SEC, Form ADV pt. 2.
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at least $150 million in assets under management must also disclose details about
their funds' investment positions, counterparties, and other information on Form PF
to the SEC, who makes the form available to the Financial Stability Oversight Coun-
cil. 97 Hedge funds must also comply with other disclosure requirements under the
Exchange Act arising out of any large equity investments in public companies.98
The Advisers Act also requires hedge fund managers to keep specific busi-
ness and accounting records, to protect any client assets over which the fund has legal
custody, and ensure that their own personnel comply with federal securities law and
regulation.99 Rule 206(4)-7 of the Advisers Act requires fund managers to establish a
compliance program that includes written policies and procedures and a designated
chief compliance officer.loo These requirements have spurred a renewed focus on
compliance and best practices by market participants.' 0
97 SEC, Form PF, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf, Reporting
by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trad-
ing Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3308, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128 (Oct. 31,
2011).
98 First, hedge funds must disclose large shareholdings of public companies. To regulate the market
for control of public companies, sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act require that hedge funds
or their advisers disclose beneficial ownership of greater than 5% in a class of voting shares of securities
registered under the Act and disclose whether the purpose of such ownership is to acquire or influence
the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (g); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a). In connection with preventing insider
trading, section 16(a) requires that hedge funds, upon acquiring a 10% ownership stake in any issuer's
class of voting equity securities registered pursuant to the Exchange Act, must disclose such ownership,
any other equity ownership in the company, and any subsequent changes in such ownership. 15 U.S.C. §
78(p)(3)(B); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1, 240.16a-2. In addition, under section 13(f) hedge funds owning
more than $100 million in stock traded on a national exchange are required to quarterly disclose to the
public all of their equity holdings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-l(b); Disclosure of Short Sales and Short Posi-
tions by Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange Act Release No. 58,785, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,678
(Oct. 17, 2008).
9 SEC, supra note 34, at 32-38.
100 Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release
No. 2204, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74714 (Dec. 24, 2003). The
SEC's adopting release reviews specific issues that a fund manager's compliance program should ad-
dress. Id. Industry participants have also identified compliance best practices for hedge funds. See, e.g.,
ADVENT SOFTWARE & Focus I Assocs., THE IMPACT OF DODD-FRANK ON YOUR FRONT OFFICE: THE
FIVE KEY SEC ALARMS AND BEST PRACTICES TO AVOID TRIGGERING THEM (2011),
http://www.focuslassociates.com/library/doddfrank.pdf; CITI PRIME FIN., DODD-FRANK PRIVATE FUND
MANAGER REGULATION: A NEW ERA OF COMPLIANCE (2011).
101 See AKIN Gump STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, ANNUAL COMPLIANCE OBLIGATIONS OF
INVESTMENT MANAGER AFTER DODD FRANK (2012); CITI PRIME FINANCE, supra note 100, at 13.
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II. Hedge Fund Agency Costs
Hedge fund managers are the agents of their investors. However, the wide-
ranging powers that managerialism bestows upon hedge fund managers potentially
allow them to impose significant agency costs on investors in the form of losses and
inefficiencies. Investors bear agency costs due to misaligned incentives between
managers and investors and from managers acting opportunistically when they are
better informed. 102 Agency costs have the effect of reducing investors' risk-adjusted
returns, either through losses or by depriving investors of better returns.0 o3 Hedge
fund agency costs arise from five primary sources: fraud or misreporting with respect
to a fund's performance and other characteristics, incentive misalignments due to
how hedge fund managers are compensated, overly long redemption restrictions,
managers appropriating fund profits, and managers favoring certain investors or ser-
vice providers. Empirical studies suggest that the most significant source of agency
costs is the subtle manipulation of performance returns (valuation) by managers when
it suits their interests.10 4
A. Fraud and Misreporting
The most basic type of hedge fund agency cost is manager fraud through
misreporting some aspect of the fund's returns, asset values, risk taking, or invest-
ment activities. This accords with agency theory, which predicts that agents may try
to manipulate the performance measures used by their principals. 05 Hedge fund in-
vestors may potentially be subject to higher agency costs from misreporting than in-
vestors in government-registered investment companies. This is because hedge funds
102 See D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 12-
14 (2009). See generally Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcoN.
288 (1980); Eugene Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions, 14 J.
FIN. ECON. 101 (1985); Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incen-
tive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991); Michael Jensen &
William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital Structure, 3 J.
FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
103 Hedge fund agency costs may also be exacerbated by adverse selection: investors may find it
difficult to accurately determine how skilled a manager is, or how exposed they are to risky investment
strategies. See generally Dean P. Foster & H. Peyton Young, The Hedge Fund Game: Incentives, Excess
Returns, and Piggy-Backing (Mar. 2, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/1 352.pdf.
04 See infra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.




are not required by regulation to value their assets according to SEC guidelines.106
Unlike public companies, there is no market for hedge fund short sellers actively at-
tempting to uncover and profit from hedge fund fraud.10 7
Hedge fund managers' compensation and desire to attract investors gives
them several incentives to misreport their returns. Hedge fund managers have an in-
centive to overstate performance to increase their performance-based compensation,
to be able to charge higher fees to new investors attracted by prior high performance,
and to attract and retain capital. Managers, likewise, have an incentive to overstate
asset values to increase management fees and an incentive to understate returns when
an investor withdraws capital to increase the capital the fund retains. In addition,
managers have an incentive to understate the volatility a fund's returns to increase its
risk-adjusted performance. Empirical studies indicate that some managers may act on
these incentives to the detriment of investors.
In a study comparing hedge funds' stock holding valuations reported to the
SEC with the stocks' closing prices as reported in the widely used Center for Re-
search in Security Prices, 25% of hedge fund managers were found to have reported
economically significant valuation discrepancies (2.5% on average). 08 The valuation
discrepancies were likely not random, as they were found to be more likely where
managers self-report to commercial performance databases, are domiciled in offshore
jurisdictions, and performed poorly in the prior year.' 09 Other studies have also found
that hedge funds report higher returns in December by underreporting returns earlier
in the year," 0 increase the value of their stock holdings through end-of-month market
purchases,"' and revise or delay poor past performance."12
Studies also suggest that some hedge funds may deliberately understate the
volatility of their returns. The funds most likely to do so are those holding illiquid as-
106 INv. Co. INST., SEC VALUATION AND LIQUIDITY GUIDANCE FOR REGISTERED INVESTMENT
COMPANIES 87-102 (2011), http://www.ici.org/pdf/publ Ivaluation volumel.pdf
107 LACK, supra note 25, at 129.
108 Gjergji Cici et al., The Valuation ofHedge Funds'Equity Positions 2 (AFA 2012 Chicago Meet-
ings Paper, Working Paper No. 10-15, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1664461.
109 Id. at 4-5.
110 Vikas Agarwal et al., Do Hedge Funds Manage Their Reported Returns?, 24 REv. FIN. STUD.
3281, 3283 (2011).
11 Itzhak Ben-David et al., Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock Prices?, 68 J. FIN. 2383, 2432
(2013) (finding "data to test the conjecture that hedge funds manipulate stock prices at the the end of the
month by buying some of their stock holdings before market close").
112 Andrew J. Patton et al., Change You Can Believe In? Hedge Fund Data Revisions, J. FIN. (forth-
coming 2014), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1934543; George 0. Aragon & Vikram Nanda,
Strategic Delays and Clustering in Hedge Fund Reported Returns 3 (Sept. 3, 2013) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://www.public.asu.edu/-goaragon/Papers/HFDelay.pdf.
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sets or assets that otherwise give managers discretion in valuation,"' funds advised
by managers with greater performance incentives,'l4 and funds with investors that are
more likely to withdraw in response to return volatility."' Other hedge funds with a
greater tendency to misreport include those where managers have more to gain from
misreporting, such as funds that have a stronger relationship between reported returns
and capital inflowsll 6 and funds that recently reported poor returns.'" 7 A relatively
common type of misreporting by managers is reporting small positive returns, as op-
posed to small losses, when the discretion inherent in valuing illiquid assets permits
them to do so.' 18
Important questions include the economic significance and the effects of
fraud or misreporting." 9 Empirical studies suggest they may be significant when they
occur but that they are not pervasive in the industry. A study by Castle Hall, a hedge
fund due diligence firm, estimated that through June 30, 2009, only about 3% of
hedge management companies committed fraud and that the losses from hedge fund
113 Gavin Cassar & Joseph Gerakos, Hedge Funds: Pricing Controls and the Smoothing of Self-
reported Returns, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1698, 1698 (2011) ("We find that funds using less verifiable pric-
ing sources and funds that provide managers with greater discretion in pricing investment positions are
more likely to have returns consistent with intentional smoothing."); Mila Getmansky et al., An Econo-
metric Model of Serial Correlation and Illiquidity in Hedge Fund Returns, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 529, 546,
589 (2004). See also Jennifer Banzaca, Key Considerations for Hedge Fund Managers in Organizing
and Operating Valuation Committees, 5 HEDGE FUND L. REP., no. 32, Aug. 2012, ("As a general rule,
greater difficulty in valuing portfolio assets leads to a more acute valuation conflict ... . For assets of
uncertain value, a manager can strike its mark within a range of plausible values."), available at
http://www.hflawreport.com/articlesIby/topic/85.
"4 Shuang Feng & Mila Getmansky, Return Smoothing, Managerial Incentives, and Hedge Fund
Failures 19 (Sept. 19, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.fma.org/Denver/Papers/smoothing.pdf.
15 See generally Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Veronika K. Pool, Conditional Return Smoothing in the
Hedge Fund Industry, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIs 267 (2009).
1 6 Ben-David et al., supra note 111; Petri Jylha, Hedge Fund Return Misreporting: Incentives and
Effects 2 (Nov. 10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1661075.
"7 Adam L. Aiken, Hedge Funds, Return Smoothing, and the Pricing of Illiquid Assets: Evidence
from Debt Holdings 31 (Aug. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228547284_Hedgefunds returnsmoothing and thepricing
of illiquid assetsEvidence from debt holdings.
1i8 See generally Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Veronika K. Pool, Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport
Returns? Evidence from the Pooled Distribution. 64 J. FIN. 2257 (2009).
119 In general, fraud or misreporting reduces the wealth of existing investors by causing transfers of
wealth and economic losses. The welfare effects among groups of investors may be ambiguous under
certain circumstances, however. Existing investors may benefit from overstatements of performance be-
cause new investors will be overcharged for their shares when they buy into the fund. And if investors
are withdrawing capital from a fund, understating returns benefits the investors that remain because too
little will be paid out to departing investors. Jylha, supra note 116.
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fraud totaled $15 billion,12 0 which was less than 1% of the total assets hedge funds
managed at the time (approximately $1.4 trillion).121 In their study of potential artifi-
cial smoothing of hedge fund returns, Bollen and Pool estimated that, at most, only of
a subgroup of hedge funds had returns that could indicate fraud.12 2
However, other studies suggest that subtle manipulation of performance re-
turns may impose significant costs on at least some investors. A study by Bollen and
Pool of mangers that avoided reporting small negative returns found approximately
10% of relevant returns to be misreported, such that new investors overpaid by ap-
proximately $1 to $2 billion to the benefit of existing investors. 123 Patton et al. found
that over 15% of the over 18,000 hedge funds in their sample revised a previous
monthly return by at least 1%.124 Cici et al. found that 25% of hedge fund managers
make small, yet economically significant, misstatements about the value of their
stock holdings. 125 Feng and Getmansky's study of hedge fund return smoothing
found evidence implying that, on average, hedge funds report only 84.9 percent of
their monthly returns, with the 15.1% distributed over the next two months. 126
Agarawal et al. found small, but economically significant, reported performance
spikes in December,127 and Ben-David et al. found that hedge fund manipulation
causes end-of-month stock prices to be inflated by an average of 0.3% for stocks in
the top quartile of hedge fund ownership.12 8
B. Fee-Based Incentive Misalignments
Agency costs also arise from the structure of hedge fund managers' annual
compensation. A basic agency cost arises from managers earning fees on an annual
basis for investment positions or strategies that are longer-term in nature. In such a
case, a manager may be able to earn performance fees in the early years of a strategy
and then pass losses along to investors when the investment ultimately suffers loss-
120 CASTLE HALL ALTS., FROM MANHATTAN TO MADOFF: THE CAUSES AND LESSONS OF HEDGE FUND
OPERATIONAL FAILURE 6 (2009),
http://www.castlehallaltematives.com/upload/publications/2507 ManhattantoMadoffPaper.pdf.
121 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A GLOBAL APPROACH TO REGULATING HEDGE FUNDS? 8 (2009),
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/asset-management/assets/pdf/AMNO609 04.pdf.
122 Bollen & Pool, supra note 115.
123 Bollen & Pool, supra note 118.
124 Patton et al., supra note 112, at 2.
125 Gjergji Cici et al, supra note 108.
126 Feng & Getmansky, supra note 114.
127 Vikas Agarwal et al., supra note 110, at 3297, 3299.
128 Itzhak Ben-David et al., supra note 111, at 2383.
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es.129 Paying managers on an annual basis may, therefore, give them an incentive to
pursue strategies that have relatively short-term gains and are likely to have long-
term losses, strategies often described as selling disaster insurance (or deep out-of-
the-money put options).
A second hedge fund compensation-based agency cost is similar to a general
agency problem in the corporate context, which stems from business managers in-
creasing their risk taking after obtaining capital from investors. In particular, a firm's
equityholders have an incentive to increase risk at the expense of a firm's creditors
because equityholders have limited liability, while nonetheless benefitting from po-
tentially unlimited upside. Creditors, on the other hand, generally do not stand to
benefit from a firm increasing its risk after a credit extension. The agency cost from
this divergence of interests is known as "asset substitution" and is extensively studied
in corporate finance literature.1 3 0
In the hedge fund context, a fund's equity investors - as opposed to its debt
holders - may likewise be subject to an asset substitution problem in the sense that
managers change their risk-taking behavior after equity investors have contributed
their capital. Hedge fund managers may have incentives to take on greater risk after
obtaining investor capital because of the asymmetric payoff structure resulting from
their performance-based compensation arrangement: the manager shares in the profits
of a fund with investors but not in fund losses. In addition, potential for agency costs
may be especially high because hedge fund managers potentially have far more to
gain from performance-based compensation than from the part of their compensation
that is based upon assets under management (i.e., management fees).
However, management fees may also impose agency costs on investors. At
least in the short term, a fixed management fee is not dependent on performance.
This may result in managers earning compensation even if investors have suffered
net losses. This is especially true in "zombie funds," which are funds that continue to
129 ALT. INv. MGMT. ASS'N, supra note 4, at 20. This incentive problem is a general one that exists
throughout the corporate context. As noted by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried:
Consider an executive who expects to be rewarded at the end of a given year based
on performance measures tied to the stock price at the end of that year. This com-
pensation structure may lead to two types of undesirable behavior. First, managers
may take actions that boost the stock price in the short run, even if such actions
would destroy value in the long run. For example, executives may enter into transac-
tions that improve the current bottom line but create large latent risks that could
cripple the firm in the future.
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 27, at 1922.
130 See generally Nengjiu Ju & Hui Ou-Yang, Asset Substitution and Underinvestment: A Dynamic
View (April 2, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-686407.
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operate and collect management fees even though their losses have been so large that
they are unlikely to ever be profitable for investors. For very large hedge funds, com-
pensation earned pursuant to management fees far exceeds that necessary to pay for
operating overhead and, thereby, reduces the incentives for managers to earn profits
for investors. As one observer states:
For the 200-plus funds with $1 billion or more in assets, management
fees alone can keep the lights on - and then some. One hedge fund
honcho whose multibillion-dollar fund shut down in 2008 says that he
got the biggest payday of his career that year, thanks to the manage-
ment fees collected before the fund's demise.'31
Incentive misalignments from management fees may be exacerbated by the fact that,
on average, management fees account for a greater share of industry-wide manager
compensation than performance fees.132
C. Restrictions on Investor Redemptions
Redemption restrictions give hedge fund investments the quality of asset-
specificity. According to transaction cost economics, asset-specificity gives rise to
potential agency costs because investment-specific assets leave an investor vulnera-
ble to unexpected changes in asset prices or opportunistic conduct by managers.133 In
the hedge fund context, the use of lockups, notice periods, or gates temporarily re-
duce the ability of investors to withdraw their capital and may permit the manager to
opportunistically use investor funds for its own benefit, thereby imposing an agency
cost on investors. Moral hazard is also created in such a situation because when re-
demptions are restricted, the investor has little, if any, ability to discipline the manag-
er. For example, in the 2011 case of Paige Capital Management v. Lerner Master
Fund, a hedge fund manager acting pursuant to a contractual gate prevented an inves-
tor from withdrawing its capital. The court found that the gate was enacted solely to
131 Michelle Celarier, Survival of the Fattest, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/3001820/Survival-of-the-Fattest-Magazine-
Version.html?Articleld=3001820.
132 Shuang Feng et al., Flows: The 'Invisible Hands' on Hedge Fund Management 14 (Sept. 16,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1929205.
1 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 255 (1979).
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enable the fund to opportunistically collect management fees, while doing little to at-
tract new investors or pursue the fund's investment strategy. 134
Redemption restrictions also impose agency costs to the extent that the ina-
bility to withdraw capital imposes a foregone (opportunity) cost from not being able
to use the capital elsewhere. This may especially be the case when redemption re-
strictions coincide with the fund experiencing losses, thereby increasing the risk of
outright loss as well. Andrew Ang and Nicolas Bollen model the cost of hedge fund
redemption restrictions by measuring how much a restriction reduces the value of an
investor's right to redeem at any time (a "liquidity option").135 They conclude that,
for an investor with typical risk aversion preferences, the combination of standard
lockup, notice, and gating provisions can impose an annual cost equivalent to over 5%
of the fund's net asset value. 13 6 In addition, a study of hedge funds from 2006 to 2011
found that funds that restricted redemptions through gates and side pockets underper-
formed comparable funds not enacting such restrictions. 137 However, because the
study did not compare funds with different levels of redemption restrictions, it fails to
show that funds with more restrictions are generally worse for investors.'
D. Overcompensation of Managers
Another potential hedge fund agency cost is investors may pay more in fees
than is necessary to produce a given level of returns, thereby allowing fund managers
to capture a portion of the fund's profits at the investors' expense. One way for man-
agers to appropriate fund profits is to increase fees after good performance. Although
most hedge funds do not change their fees with respect to any particular investor, a
study of 3,814 funds from April 2008 until June 2011 found that 7.8% of funds in-
creased or decreased some aspect of their fees over a three-year period.139 The au-
thors found that performance fee increases typically followed superior performance
134 Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, No. 5502-CS, 2011 WL 3505355, at *1
(Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011).
B See generally Andrew Ang & Nicolas P. B. Bollen, When Hedge Funds Block the Exits (Jan. 14,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1 916286.
136 Id. at 2.
137 Aiken et al., supra note 2, at 3-4.
138 Indeed, funds that place more restrictions on investor redemptions may perform better. See infra
Part III.E.
13 Vikas Agarwal & Sugata Ray, Determinants and Implications of Fee Changes in the Hedge Fund
Industry 4-5 (Mar. 15, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2024362.
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and that funds with increasing capital flows increased management fees.140 Because
performance typically decreased after fees were increased, the fee increases may in-
dicate that managers were opportunistically taking advantage of high demand for
their funds. 14' Likewise, other studies provide evidence suggesting that managers
with abnormally high performance increase their performance fee rate (when starting
new funds) to capture a larger portion of their above-average profits, which ultimate-
ly reduces investors' returns to the average.14 2
Even for managers that do not increase their fees for existing or new inves-
tors, the typical hedge fund fee structure may overcompensate hedge fund managers
in the sense that investors could have obtained the same or greater returns by invest-
ing in vehicles with lower fees. In a 2011 study of the returns of nearly 11,000 hedge
funds, Ilia Dichev and Gwen Yu used a "dollar-weighted" measure of performance to
estimate the actual returns investors' obtained.143 They found that returns to hedge
funds investors from 1990 to 2008 were typically lower than the stock market and
only slightly higher than the risk-free rate earned by investing in government
bonds.144 An implication of their study is that any fees or other additional costs asso-
ciated with hedge fund investing are agency costs that can be eliminated or substan-
tially reduced by directly investing in the markets or in low-cost passive investment
vehicles (e.g., index funds that track the performance of markets). The time-weighted
measure of hedge fund performance, however, indicates that hedge funds provide
value to investors even after fees are paid to managers.145 In addition, a recent study
found that nearly three-quarters of fund profits go to investors, not managers, which
indicates that performance fees are not generally too high or structured to allow man-
agers to be paid before losses are passed along to investors.14 6
140 Id. at 5-7.
" Id. at 7.
142 Ivan Guidotti & Istvan G. Nagy, Rational Behavior of Hedge Fund Managers and Investors 4
(December 10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-=1972148. See also
William Fung et al., Hedge Funds: Performance, Risk, and Capital Formation, 63 J. FIN. 1777, 1780
(2008) ("Our evidence also suggests that capital inflows adversely impact alpha at the aggregate lev-
el."); Tarun Ramadorai & Michael Streatfield, Money for Nothing? Understanding Variation in Report-
ed Hedge Fund Fees 3 (Mar. 28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract- 1798628.
43 See generally Ilia D. Dichev & Gwen Yu, Higher Risk, Lower Returns: What Hedge Fund Inves-
tors Really Earn, 100 J. FIN. EcON. 248 (2011).
14 Id.
145 See infra Part III.D.
146 See CTR. FOR HEDGE FUND RESEARCH, supra note 26.
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E. Favoritism of Certain Investors or Service Providers
Hedge fund investors may suffer from agency costs due to managers giving
favorable treatment to some investors over others or to service providers at the ex-
pense of investors generally. Favoritism may exacerbate any preexisting incentive or
tendency to commit fraud or misreport returns because favoritism may require the
manager to misreport returns or some other aspect of the fund's operations.
Through separate agreements known as "side letters," certain hedge fund in-
vestors may obtain favorable terms for themselves that are not offered to all investors
in the fund's general offering documents. 147 Managers may grant favorable terms to
curry favor with certain investors because the size, timing, or nature of their invest-
ments make their capital particularly important to the manager. Side letters may give
investors favorable treatment regarding fees, disclosure, liquidity, and other terms.14 8
Favorable liquidity or disclosure terms may allow some investors to exit the fund
ahead of other investors and, thereby, create a conflict of interest between the manag-
er and the investors without the favorable terms. As a matter of law, side letters are
permitted so long as giving favorable treatment to some investors does not violate the
contractual rights of other investors or the manager's fiduciary duty to generally
avoid giving preferential treatment to some investors to the detriment of others.14 9
Compliance with these legal obligations can be accomplished by disclosing the na-
ture of the fund's side letters or by establishing separate classes of investors with dif-
ferential investment terms.150 Side letters likely do not impose significant, if any,
costs on hedge fund investors when they are disclosed and their terms are followed.
However, undisclosed side letters granting preferential withdrawal rights may impose
significant costs on some investors, when they allow favored investors to exit a poor-
ly performing fund.'"'
147 Mark Perlow, Managing Hedge Fund Conflicts of Interest, 40 REv. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG.,
no. 7, Apr. 2007, at 75.
148 Id. A "most favored nation" side letter clause promises that an investor will be offered any supe-
rior terms offered to other investors. Id.
149 Testimony Concerning Hedge Funds Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & Inv. of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs (2006) (statement of Susan Ferris Wyderko, Director, Office of In-
vestor Education & Assistance); HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 90.
Iso Perlow, supra note 147, at 77-78; SEC, supra note 96 ("As a fiduciary, you ... must seek to
avoid conflicts of interest with your clients, and, at a minimum, make full disclosure of all material con-
flicts of interest between you and your clients that could affect the advisory relationship.") (emphasis in
original).
5I See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Connecticut-Based Hedge Fund Managers with Fraud
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-28.htm (alleging that hedge fund secretly
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Investors may also suffer from agency costs due to managers giving favora-
ble treatment to service providers at their expense. For example, prime brokers pro-
vide a wide array of services to hedge funds including trade execution, securities
lending, investment research, and investor referrals, which help establish new funds.
Hedge funds may pay for such services with "soft dollar" payments - by directing
trades to their prime broker or affiliated third parties, or paying above-market rates
for brokerage commissions. 5 2 Soft dollar payments may impose an agency cost on
investors if the services purchased by inflated commissions or trades directed to
suboptimal brokers benefit the manager more than investors, who ultimately subsi-
dize the soft dollar payments.' Undisclosed soft dollar payments to prime brokers
may constitute a conflict of interest subject to an enforcement action by the SEC or
other regulatory authorities.154 Favoring certain service providers may also take the
form of appointing service provider representatives to the fund's board of directors.
In such a case, the director may impose agency costs by providing relatively less in-
dependent oversight on managers.'5 5 However, despite the potential for agency costs
granted favorable liquidity terms to largest investor prior to the fund's collapse).
152 GREGORY CURTIS, GREYCOURT & CO, INC., WHITE PAPER No. 4 - SoFT DOLLARS: GREYCOURT'S
PoSITION 1 (2001), available at http://www.greycourt.com/wp-content/uploads/file/WhitePaper004-
Soft dollars-GDC.pdf ("The phrase 'soft dollars' refers to several related activities, all involving the
practice of paying for services other than securities trades with commission dollars" owed to the bro-
ker.); SEC, INSPECTION REPORT ON THE SoFT DOLLAR PRACTICES OF BROKER-DEALERS, INVESTMENT
ADVISERS AND MUTUAL FUNDS (1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/softdolr.htm (de-
fining soft dollar payments as "arrangements under which products or services other than execution of
securities transactions are obtained by an adviser from or through a broker-dealer in exchange for the
direction by the adviser of client brokerage transactions to the broker-dealer").
1s3 See Stephen M. Horan & D. Bruce Johnsen, Does Soft Dollar Brokerage Benefit Investors:
Agency Problem or Solution? 6 (George Mason School of Law, Law & Econ. Working Series, Paper
No. 04-50, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=615281. In the words of former SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox, soft dollar payments may result in managers using "their clients' commissions [or
fees] to buy research that the managers would otherwise have to pay for out of their own pockets or pro-
duce themselves." Letter from Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, to The Honorable Christopher Dodd,
Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs (May 17, 2007) (on file with author).
1I4 See Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Company Act Release No. 26,409, Advisors Act Release
No. 2224, 82 SEC Docket 2036 (Mar. 31, 2004); Commission Guidance Regarding Client Commission
Practices Under Section 28(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No.
54,165, 71 Fed. Reg. 41,978 (July 24, 2006); PROSKAUER, CLIENT COMMISSION (SoFT DOLLAR)
ARRANGEMENTS: THE SECTION 28(E) SAFE HARBOR 1 (2011), available at
http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/broker-dealer/Client-Commission-Soft-Dollar-
Arrangements.pdf; Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., SMH Capital Fined $450,000 for Pro-
cedural Failures Regarding Soft Dollar Payments, Distributing Improper Hedge Fund Sales Materials
(Jan. 9, 2008), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008/PO37758.
1ss See ALT. INv. MGMT. Ass'N, AIMA'S OFFSHORE ALTERNATIVE FUND DIRECTORS' GUIDE 6, (2d
ed. 2008) ("Best practice for any Fund would be to ... avoid appointing Directors who represent the
advisers or service providers to the Fund because of the potential for conflicts of interest.").
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from service provider favoritism, they may not be substantial in practice. Soft dollar
payments may reduce agency costs stemming from underinvestment in research.' 56 In
addition, the benefit of bringing service providers' expertise to the board may miti-
gate any problems associated with appointing them as directors.
III. Hedge Fund Governance Devices
Despite the managerialist foundations of hedge fund governance, managers
adopt investor-friendly governance devices that reduce agency costs in response to
investor demand and competition. In addition to the funds' underlying legal regime
and the contractual device of placing short-term redemption restrictions on investor
redemptions,'"' hedge fund governance devices fall into three categories: those that
are driven directly by equity investors, those that arise from managers' performance-
based compensation, and those that are required by the funds' short-term creditors.
This Part reviews each of these types of governance mechanisms and concludes by
assessing whether the investor-responsive aspects of hedge fund governance are suf-
ficient to overcome the agency costs allowed for by managerialism.
A. Investor Driven Governance
1. Capital Inflows and Outflows
Despite being subject to short-term restrictions on their withdrawal rights, a
primary governance mechanism over hedge fund managers is the high propensity of
investors to withdraw or not commit their funds in response to poor performance or
governance. Unsurprisingly, hedge fund investors decide to invest largely based on
the fund's past performance.'5 8 Hedge fund investors are also quick to withdraw their
156 See Horan & Johnsen, supra note 153, at 20-21.
1s7 See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
158 Vikas Agarwal et al., Flows, Performance, and Managerial Incentives in Hedge Funds 30 (EFA
2003 Annual Conference, Paper No. 501, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=424369 (finding
that "money-flows chase recent good performance"); Andrea Beltratti & Claudio Morana, Aggregate
Hedge Funds' Flows and Returns, 18 App. FIN. ECON. 1755, 1755-57 (2008); Guido Bolliger et al.,
Hedge Fund Investing in the Aftermath of the Crisis: Where Did the Money Go?, 14 J. ALT.
INVESTMENTS 8, 8-9 (2011); Bill Ding et al., Market Volatility, Investor Flows, and the Structure of
Hedge Fund Markets 3 (Nov. 6, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (finding evidence
that hedge fund investors are "smart" such that they have skill in allocating capital to funds that perform
above-average); Ivan Guidotti & Istvan G. Nagy, Rational Behavior of Hedge Fund Managers and In-
vestors (Dec. 10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1972148
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capital from poorly performing funds.'5 9 Hedge fund investors seem particularly sen-
sitive to performance and are more likely than mutual fund investors to withdraw
their capital in sufficiently large amounts to jeopardize the fund's survival.16 0
In addition to performance, hedge fund investors care about governance. In-
stitutional hedge fund investors typically demand some threshold level of quality
with respect to governance and will withdraw their funds, or refuse to invest in the
first place, if the fund lacks the desired quality.' 6' For example, in 2009 CalPERS
stated that it would no longer invest in hedge funds in which manager compensation
was perceived as misaligning incentive.' 62 Accordingly, maintaining a baseline level
of governance is necessary for funds to attract and retain investor capital. Indeed, sat-
isfying investors' performance and governance preferences is so important that hedge
funds employ full-time professionals tasked with raising capital from investors and
addressing their concerns so long as they are invested.163
General financial industry trends are likely putting additional pressure on
managers to provide more investor-friendly governance terms. This is because, as the
hedge fund industry has grown, the ability to outperform other hedge funds has likely
become more difficult. Not only does more funds pursuing the same investment strat-
egy generally reduce potential gains from the strategy,16 4 but it also increases the
("Flows rationally respond to expected abnormal returns."); Jenke ter Horst & Galla Salganik, Style
Chasing by Hedge Fund Investors (Jan. 25, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.comabstract-1362576. Investors' allocations to high performing funds may, however, be un-
dermined by their lack of ability to detect true outperformance. Guillermo Baquero, On Hedge Fund
Performance, Capital Flows and Investor Psychology 162 (Dec. 7, 2006) (unpublished Ph. D. Thesis,
Erasmus University Rotterdam), available at
http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/8192/EPS2006094F&A905892131 XBaquero.pdf.
59 Guillermo Baquero & Marno Verbeek, A Portrait of Hedge Fund Investors: Flows, Performance
and Smart Money 6-7 (Oct. 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-773384 (finding that hedge fund investors rapidly withdraw capital from under-
performing funds). See also Horst & Salganik, supra note 158, at I (finding that hedge fund investors
"subsequently reallocate fundsfrom less successful to more successful styles") (emphasis added).
160 See Ben-David et al., supra note 10; Burton G. Malkiel & Atanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and
Return, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 80, 85 (2005) ("Most hedge fund attrition rates are three or four times
greater than the mutual fund rates.").
161 ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, supra note 4 ("Governance has become a 'make or break' area in the
investment decision-making process."); CARNE GLOBAL FIN. SERVS., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
HEDGE FUNDS: INVESTOR SURVEY 2011 9-11 (2011); see also ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, supra note 4, at 9
("Most sophisticated investors will scrutinise the entire legal structure prior to investment . . . .").
162 Letter from Kurt Silberstein, Senior Portfolio Manager, Global Equity, & Craig Dandurand, Port-
folio Manager, Global Equity, to CalPERS Hedge Fund Partners (Mar. 11, 2009) (on file with author).
163 See generally LAURIE A. THOMPSON, HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS SALES
& MARKETING A VIEW OF COMPENSATION & RECRUITING TRENDS (2009), available at
http://www.heidrick.com/PublicationsReports/PublicationsReports/HS Alternativelnvestments.pdf.
64 William Fung et al., supra note 142, at 1797.
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likelihood that any superior returns obtained by a particular strategy will be short-
lived, as rival managers and other traders discover and imitate each other's trading
strategies.16 Hedge fund managers as a whole may also be facing increasing pressure
due to growing competition from other potential investment opportunities. This com-
petition includes the growing market for cheaper and more liquid hedge funds alter-
natives, such as mutual funds using hedge fund-like strategies, exchange-traded funds,
and synthetic hedge fund "clones," potentially able to replicate the returns of hedge
funds. 166
2. Investor Demand for Quality Governance
Given that investors base their investment decisions in part upon the hedge
funds' perceived governance quality, it is important to note the specific governance
(and operational) characteristics that investors consider to be high quality. Investor
surveys indicate a substantial degree of uniformity and sophistication regarding the
types of governance and operational characteristics they demand. Hedge fund inves-
tors' demand for higher quality governance has increased in the past decade due to
increasing institutionalization and sophistication, negative experiences during the fi-
nancial crisis of 2008, and the reaction to the Bernard Madoff fraud.167
Unsurprisingly, hedge fund investors have strong preferences when it comes
to risk. Investors demand that portfolio-level risks be subject to pre-defined limits,
165 RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OwN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE
PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 195 (2008).
166 Vikas Agarwal et al., Hedge Funds for Retail Investors? An Examination of Hedged Mutual
Funds, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891621;
William Fung & David A. Hsieh, Hedge Fund Replication Strategies: Implications for Investors and
Regulators, 10 BANQUE DE FR. FIN. STABILITY REV., no. 10, Apr. 2007, at 55; Marc Hogan, Hedge
Funds: Attack of the Clones, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2006), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-
03/attack-of-the-hedge-fund-clones.html.
167 CARNE GLOBAL FIN. SERVS., supra note 161, at 12; QUIRK & BANK OF N.Y. MELLON, supra note
2, at 11-12 (indicating trend toward greater transparency); Lori Barton, Opening the Door on Hedge
Fund Infrastructure, RISK UNIVERSE, Mar. 2012, at 20, available at http://beaumontadvisors.com/news-
events/beaumont-advisors-authors-article-opening-the-door-on-hedge-fund-infrastructure-in-risk-
universe-magazine/; Christine Williamson, Demand by Clients Gives Firms Offering Details on Portfo-
lios a Competitive Edge, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Nov. 6, 2007),
http://www.pionline.comi/article/20071015/PRINT/71012043/institutional-interest-lights-transparency-
fire. Nonetheless, as of the end of 2011, a substantial portion of hedge fund investors view hedge fund
governance as deficient. CARNE GLOBAL FIN. SERVS., supra note 161, at 13-14; Jonathan Stapleton, USS:





that new positions be simulated before adoption, and that operational, counterparty,
and liquidity risks be measured, identified, limited, and tested.'68 Although investors
may demand lockups and other short-term redemption restrictions to preserve fund
stability,169 they nonetheless prefer to be able to redeem most, if not all, of their capi-
tal within one year.170
Investors also have strong preferences regarding transparency. Investors seek
comprehensive, intelligible disclosures about risk, occurring anywhere from monthly
to in real-time. "' Investors desire detailed and frequent performance reporting, to
have the fund precisely identify its investment strategy, and to monitor the manager's
investments, preventing a deviation from the stated strategy (style drift).172 In practice,
an estimated 89% of hedge funds make at least monthly disclosures to investors.' 73 In
addition to performance, these disclosures typically describe what returns were at-
tributable to a given strategy and various measures of risk-adjusted performance. 17 4
Since the financial crisis of 2008, hedge fund investors have been receiving greater
disclosures and more transparency from hedge funds. 75
Investors also seek an alignment between performance fee payment period
and investment horizon. 7 6 Accordingly, investors express a desire for performance
fees to be calculated on a multi-year basis to align incentives for long-term invest-
ments and prevent managers from being paid for investments that later result in loss-
es.177 However, although there does seem to be a trend towards calculating perfor-
68 CARNE GLOBAL FIN. SERVS., supra note 161, at 14-17.
169 Laurence Fletcher, Hedge Investors Ask For Lock-ups to Avoid Closures, REUTERS (Oct. 8,
2008), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2008/10/08/hedge-redemptions-idUKLNE49704I20081008.
17 ALT. INV. MGMT. AsS'N, supra note 4, at 21-22.
171 Id. at 12-13; QUIRK & BANK OF N.Y. MELLON, supra note 2, at 13.
172 ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, supra note 4, at 8.
1 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, TRANSPARENCY VERSUS RETURNS: THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
VIEW OF ALTERNATIVE ASSETS 50 (2008), available at
http://www.qrmo.com/pdf/PwC alternatives briefing.pdf.
74 See Email from Bruce Gibney & Alda Leu, Clarium Capital Management LLC, to Nancy M.
Morris, Secretary, SEC, at 5 (Mar. 9, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-
06/s72506-566.pdf.
175 STATE STREET, HEDGE FUNDS: REBUILDING ON A NEW FOUNDATION 4-5 (2011); Diane Harrison,
A Battle Cry for Hedge Funds: Separate But Not Equal, FINALTERNATIVES (Apr. 3, 2012),
http://www.finalternatives.com/node/20097.
76 ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, supra note 4, at 18-26; Letter From Kurt Silberstein & Craig Dandurand,
supra note 162.
177 See K&L GATES & OPTCAPITAL, FUND APPRECIATION RIGHTS: WHAT THEY ARE AND How THEY
CAN WORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND HEDGE FUND MANAGERS 4-5 (2009); UTAH RET. Sys.,
SUMMARY OF PREFERRED HEDGE FUND TERMS 2 (2009), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/ursnote03102009.pdf.
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mance fees on a multi-year basis,17 8 only a small portion of hedge funds actually do
so.179 This discrepancy likely reflects the strong bargaining power that managers have
over investors on this issue and presents a potential significant area for improvement
in governance.
Investors expect that trade processing be automated as much as possible, that
internal controls relating to trading be automated and documented, and that fund ser-
vice providers be fully vetted and frequently interact with management.s 0 When it
comes to valuation, investors expect that managers have external oversight and well-
documented practices and controls, especially with respect to illiquid assets, to guard
against fraud and performance smoothing. 18' Overall, there has been a trend for funds
to move away from using in-house capabilities or prime brokers towards using third-
party administrators and other less conflicted service providers for valuation, asset
custody, and other operational functions.182
Investor surveys also indicate that, with respect to hedge fund board over-
sight and powers, investors prefer that boards have the power to replace managers,
that service providers report directly to boards, and that boards (instead of managers)
be ultimately responsible for valuation and decisions regarding suspending fund re-
demptions. 183 Investors also prefer that hedge fund directors sit on no more than thir-
ty boards, that hedge funds boards have no less than three directors (at least two of
whom are independent), that the manager is represented on the board, and that direc-
tors be full-time, professional directors.18 4 Investors in funds that do not have boards
indicate that having a board would be a welcomed development.' 85 Investors may al-
so seek an option to purchase shares with voting rights over important events, includ-
178 See Emma Cusworth, Hedge Fund Fees Under the Microscope by Investors as Performance
Slides, HEDGE FUNDS REv. (Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.risk.net/hedge-funds-
review/feature/2245575/hedge-fund-fees-microscope-investors-performance-slides.
179 See SEWARD & KISSEL LLP, MEMORANDUM TO OUR INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CLIENTS AND
FRIENDS: 2011 NEW HEDGE FUND STUDY 2 (2011), available at
http://fundtaxservices.com/PDFs/2011NewHedgeFundStudy.pdf (finding that relative to standard per-
formance compensation measured annually "[1]ess than 10% of funds, in the aggregate, had modified
high-water mark provisions, hurdle rates or incentive allocation/fees measured over multi-year peri-
ods;?, ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, supra note 4, at 34-37.
"8 Id. at 37-40.
182 DELOITrE, HEDGE FUND ADMINISTRATORS: How TO CAPITALISE ON THE GROWING DEMANDS OF A
SHIFTING INVESTOR BASE 1 (2011); QUIRK & BANK OFN.Y. MELLON, supra note 2, at 13-16.
183 ALT. INV. MGMT. Ass'N, supra note 4, at 9.
' Id. at 10-11; CARNE GLOBAL FIN. SERVS., supra note 161, at 19, 23-24, 27.
185 CARNE GLOBAL FIN. SERVS., supra note 161, at 33.
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ing fund dissolution or certain changes in the investment manager and directors.18
However, hedge fund investors do not typically demand the ability to remove manag-
TS187ers.'8
Hedge fund investors also have preferences regarding a wide range of other
specific governance issues. To align incentives, investors prefer that hedge fund
managers co-invest in the funds they manage and have the same liquidity rights as
other investors.188 Investors desire clear communications regarding fund organiza-
tional structure and related entities, clear segregation between front and back office
personnel, and documentation regarding internal controls and conflicts.' 89 Investors
also expect disclosure of any legal issues, an independent and well-documented com-
pliance function, and that any preferential treatment given to some investors be dis-
closed and receive board approval.' 90 Investors may also want assurances that the
fund has a diversified and sophisticated client base' 9 ' and carries insurance to protect
against legal claims.' 92
High quality operational practices are a substitute governance mechanism for
other mechanisms, such as strict regulatory enforcement and reputation. Accordingly,
hedge fund investors demand higher quality operational practices when a fund is or-
ganized in a jurisdiction where enforcement is considered lax or if the fund is less es-
tablished.19 3 Investors also price in the risk of fraud and other operational problems
by paying lower fees to funds with weaker operational practices.194
Investor demand for quality operational practices can also be assisted by the
fact that investors may detect fraud and other operational risks ex ante. There is an
entire advisory industry dedicated to providing hedge fund due diligence services,
which include making books and other materials available to prospective and current
investors to assist them in assessing the operational quality of hedge funds.' A
186 ALT. INv. MGMT. Ass'N,supra note 4, at 8.
187 Sklar, supra note 52, at 7.
188 ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS'N, supra note 4, at 20.
'89 Id. at 30.
90 Id. at 31-33.
"' Id. at 25.
192 Ricardo Kaulessar, Hedge Funds Face Higher Insurance Rates in 2012, EVESTMENT (Mar. 15,
2012) (quoting an insurance advisory firm executive as stating that "[w]hat's driven the need to carry the
[hed e fund] insurance is investor demand").
Gavin Cassar & Joseph Gerakos, Determinants of Hedge Funds Internal Controls and Fees, 85
AcCT. REV. 1887, 1888 (2010).
194 Id
195 See, e.g., MATTHEw RIDLEY, How TO INVEST IN HEDGE FUNDS: AN INVESTMENT PROFESSIONAL'S
GUIDE (2004).
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growing body of academic studies may also be able to help investors detect which
hedge funds are more likely to commit fraud or suffer from other operational defi-
ciencies.196 For example, one study found that returns are more likely to be misre-
ported as marginally positive (rather than zero or marginally negative) when funds
can be sold via distribution channels with relatively less third party scrutiny and in
funds without lockups preventing investors from withdrawing capital.1 97 Another
study found that regulatory investigations for fraud or misstatements are far more
likely when the manager - as opposed to an independent third party - is involved
in setting and reporting a fund's net asset value.198 Stephen Brown and various co-
authors have also developed various measures to assist investors in predicting fraud
and operational risk.'99 Investor demands for quality operational practices, and their
ability to predict them, are important because losses are as likely to arise from opera-
tional risks as they are from financial ones. 20 0
3. Secondary Markets for Hedge Fund Shares
Hedge fund managers may also face market discipline due to the increasingly
stable and liquid secondary market for hedge fund shares. Prior to the financial crisis
of 2008, the secondary market was small, illiquid, and run by investment banks and
one specialized intermediary between hedge fund buyers and sellers, Hedgebay.201
During the financial crisis, hedge fund managers enacted gates to reduce the impact
of investor redemptions in a market where hedge fund asset values were plummeting
and capital was often locked up in illiquid investments. As a result, hedge fund inves-
tors increasingly sold their fund shares to raise cash and typically did so at a deep
discount to the fund's net asset value. 20 2 By 2011, the secondary hedge fund market
196 See, e.g., Stephen J. Brown et al., Trust and Delegation, 103 J. FIN. EcON. 221 (2012); Stephen J.
Brown et al., Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration, 63
J. FIN. 2785 (2008); Cassar & Gerakos, supra note 193.
197 Douglas Cummings, Hedge Fund Regulation and Misreported Returns, 16 EUR. J. FIN. MGMT.
829, 831 (2010).
198 Casar & Gerakos, supra note 193.
199 See generally Stephen J. Brown et al., Estimating Operational Risk for Hedge Funds: The E-
Score (N.Y. Univ., Working Paper No. FIN-08-001, 2008), http://ssm.com/abstract- 354491.
200 See STUART PFEFFER & CHRISTOPHER KUNDRO, CAPITAL MKTS. CO., UNDERSTANDING AND
MITIGATING OPERATIONAL RISK IN HEDGE FUND INVESTMENTS 5 (2003).
201 See, e.g., FRANK K. REILLY & KEITH C. BROWN, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO
MANAGEMENT 101 (2011).




had matured to include broader market participation, several new trading intermediar-
ies in the form of online brokers and interdealer brokers, and highly sought after
shares trading near or above their net asset values.203
A secondary market allows buyers and sellers to engage in price discovery
by attempting to determine the true value of what is being traded.2 04 Given that hedge
fund investors value quality governance, it follows that the secondary market price
for a hedge fund share will reflect the quality of the fund's governance.205 Accord-
ingly, the rise of hedge fund share trading creates an incentive for managers to im-
prove, maintain, and demonstrate quality governance to prevent their shares from be-
ing sold at a discount and to attract investors in the first place.206
B. Performance-Based Governance
A defining feature of hedge funds is that their management companies are al-
so compensated based upon the performance of the funds they advise.207 Fund per-
formance is typically calculated on an annual basis. 20 8 Hedge fund performance-
based fee rates average 18% of profits in excess of prior losses and net of manage-
ment fees. 20 9 A fund manager's compensation attributable to the performance fee is
effectively the same as a payout from a call option with a "strike price" set at the val-
210
ue of the fund when each investor joins.
203 Id. at 4-5; Hedge Fund Secondary Market Sees First Trade Above NA V In Almost Two Years,
FINALTERNATIVES (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/11901.
204 See, e.g., REILLY & BROWN, supra note 201.
205 See Viceira et al., supra note 202, at 5 (noting that the secondary market price for hedge fund
shares depends in part upon the transparency of the fund's assets).
206 See Tullett Prebon, Secondary Hedge Fund Market Average Discount to NA V Grew in July,
MONEYSCIENCE (Aug. 8, 2011, 9:09 AM),
http://www.moneyscience.com/pg/newsfeeds/moneyscience/item/58625/secondary-hedge-fund-market-
average-discount-to-nav-grew-in-july-discount-to-net-asset-value-continued-to-incre-httpbitlynjgpot
("As the secondary market has continued to mature with a growing number and range of buyers, general
partners have allowed greater transparency to underlying assets remaining in illiquid hedge fund classes.
This has generally helped to improve levels as buyers gain more pricing comfort and face wider compe-
tition for transactions.").
207 See LHABITANT, supra note 56, at 30.
208 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 94-95.
209 Gregory Zuckerman et al., Hedge Funds Cut Back on Fees, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl0001424127887323893004579054952807556352.
210 Mark J.P. Anson, Hedge Fund Incentives Fees and the "Free Option," 4 J. ALT. INVESTMENTS
43, 43-44 (2001); William N. Goetzmann et al., High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Con-
tracts, 4 J. FIN. 1685, 1714-16 (2003).
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Contractual provisions requiring the fund to exceed a threshold level of re-
turns before any compensation is allocated to the manager typically limit managers'
performance-based compensation. One such provision is a high-water mark, which
limits the performance allocation to positive gains above the amount of the investor's
capital contribution. 211 A high-water mark requires any losses from previous years to
be recouped first, meaning that an investor must actually receive a net positive return
on its investment before a manager is paid a performance fee.2 12 High-water marks
are utilized by most hedge funds. 2 13 When hedge funds use high-water marks, they
typically charge investors a performance fee five times higher than those funds that
do not (15.3%), likely in exchange for investors not having to pay a performance fee
until the fund produces a profit for them.2 14
A second limit on managerial performance-based competition is a hurdle
rate, which prevents the manager from being paid unless a minimum rate of return is
achieved.2 15 Hurdle rates may be calculated annually or on a cumulative basis and
may be fixed at an absolute rate or depend on some other rate or performance
benchmark.2 16 High-water marks are more common than hurdle rates. Approximately
19% of hedge funds use hurdle rates, 217 and, when a hurdle is used, it is typically in
conjunction with a high-water mark.2 18
In addition to performance fees, a manager's own investment in the fund may
be a source of compensation. Managers often co-invest a significant portion of their
own capital directly in the underlying funds they manage. 2 19 It is estimated that be-
211 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 329-330.
212 Id. at 329; See also Goetzmann et al., supra note 210, at 1686 ("High-water mark contracts have
the appealing feature of paying the manager a bonus only when the investors make a profit, and in addi-
tion, requiring that the manager make up any earlier losses before becoming eligible for the bonus pay-
ment."). To prevent individual managers from leaving the employment of a fund well below its high-
water mark, some hedge fund operating agreements allow for a reduced performance fee allocation,
even if the high-water mark is not achieved, and other funds will reset the high-water mark at a level
below that required for an investor to recoup losses.
213 Feng et al., supra note 132, at 9.
214 Gokce Soydemir et al., Hedge Funds, Fund Attributes and Risk Adjusted Returns 7 (Sept. 15,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1896524. Because investors may
invest at different times, a process known as share equalization must be undertaken to ensure that per-
formance fees subject to high-water marks are properly calculated with respect to each investor.
HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 335.
215 Id. at 330-31.
216 id.
217 Gokce Soydemir et al., For Whom Hurdle Rate and High-Watermark Exist? 30-31 (Sept. 30,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2154639.
218 Id at 30.
2 19 HAMMER ET AL., supra note 28, at 92.
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tween 59% and 32% of managers have personal wealth in their funds.220 Managers
with higher co-investment may be less likely to use a high-water mark, since co-
investment can be a substitute incentive alignment device.22 1
Importantly, hedge fund manager compensation seems far more perfor-
mance-sensitive than that of corporate managers.222 Empirical researchers use delta to
measure the relationship between management pay and firm performance. Specifical-
ly, delta measures how much managers' wealth increases if the value of their compa-
ny increases by 1%.223 A higher delta indicates a higher sensitivity of pay to firm per-
formance. For hedge fund managers, their performance incentives are based
primarily upon their annual performance-based fees and how much they have invest-
ed in the fund.224 Based on a sample of nearly 5,000 hedge funds from January 1994
to April 2010, Feng et al. estimated the median hedge manager delta to be $1.98 mil-
lion.225 By contrast, based on a sample of public corporations from 1992 to 2006, Liu
and Mauer estimated the median delta for chief executive officers to be only
$205,000.226 Hedge fund managers thus seem to have much stronger incentives to
perform well than do corporate managers, indicating that their unique form of com-
pensation serves as an important governance device.227
220 George 0. Aragon & Vikram Nanda, On Tournament Behavior in Hedge Funds: High Water
Marks, Fund Liquidation, and the Backfilling Bias 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 937, 946 (2012) (finding that,
among the hedge fund managers investigated, 32% had personal wealth invested); Haitao Li et al., In-
vesting in Talents: Manager Characteristics and Hedge Fund Performances, 46 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 59, 65 (2011); Horst & Salganik, supra note 158.
221 Martin Ruckes & Margarita Sevostiyanova, Time to Wind Down: Closing Decisions and High
Water Marks in Hedge Fund Management Contracts 15 (Mar. 31, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://gsfaalto.fi/seminarpapers/HighWaterMarksHelsinki.pdf.
222 Feng et al., supra note 132, at 2 ("With such a high rate of incentive fees, the pay-performance
sensitivity of the hedge fund manager is higher than that of any other industry.") (emphasis added).
223 H. KENT BAKER & GERALD S. MARTIN, CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE FINANCING
DECISIONS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE 99 (2011).
224 See Vikas Agarwal et al., Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Perfor-
mance, 64 J. FIN. 2221, 2223-24 (2009).
225 Feng et al., supra note 132, at 18.
226 Yixin Liu & David C. Mauer, Corporate Cash Holdings and CEO Compensation Incentives, 102
J. FIN. ECON. 183, 188 (2011). See also David Larker & Brian Tayan, Seven Myths of Corporate Gov-
ernance 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ. Closer Look Series, Paper No. CGRP-16,
2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--1856869 (finding that on average a 1% change in firm value
leads to a $54,000 increase in the equity-based compensation of public company CEO). Notably, Feng et
al. estimates a much lower mean delta for hedge fund managers than public company CEOs than do Liu
and Mauer. Cf Feng et al., supra note 132, at 18. This most likely reflects the fact that the population of
hedge fund managers includes a significant portion of managers operating below their high-water mark,
such that an increase in firm value does not trigger performance-based compensation.
227 Pay-performance sensitivity is similarly high for private equity firms but lower for venture capi-
tal funds. See Ji-Woong Chung et al., Pay for Performance from Future Fund Flows: The Case of Pri-
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C. Short-Term Creditors and Counterparties
Hedge funds often obtain some form of short-term credit financing, or lever-
age, as part of their investment strategies.228 Hedge funds obtain leverage through
several types of transactions, including collateralized (margin) borrowing secured by
their investment positions, 22 9 cash raised through short-term sales and repurchases
(repos) of financial instruments, 2 30 and options, swaps, or other derivatives transac-
tions.231
From a governance perspective, the most important aspect of hedge fund lev-
erage is that it results in the funds being continuously and closely monitored by credi-
tors and derivatives counterparties. 23 2 Indeed, a 2008 Government Accountability Of-
fice investigation of the oversight activities of prime brokers and other hedge fund
vale Equity (Charles A. Dice Ctr., Working Paper No. 2010-003, 2001), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554626; see also Kate Litvak, Venture Capital Limited Partnership Agree-
ments: Understanding Compensation Arrangements, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 161, 163 (2009) ("[A] 1 percent
increase in the net present value (NPV) of a [venture capital] fund's returns translated into a 0.47 percent
increase in VC compensation.").
228 For an overview of the sources of hedge fund financing, see generally BARCLAYS CAPITAL
SOLUTIONS GRP., EVOLUTION OF THE HEDGE FUND FINANCING MODEL (2012),
http://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/sites/default/files/evolution of financingmodel.pdf.
229 Margin financing means to borrow against a particular investment position or an entire portfolio.
FRANK BARBARINO, NEPC, LEVERAGE, HEDGE FUNDS, AND RISK 6 (2009),
http://www.nepc.com/writable/research articles/file/09 07 nepc leverage hf and risk.pdf.
230 LHABITANT, supra note 56, at 15-16. In a repo, the amount of short-term cash a hedge fund is
able to raise depends upon the haircut being applied to the asset used as collateral. A hedge fund will not
be able to raise as much short-term cash through repos when the perception of risk increases because it
causes the haircut to the repo's collateral to increase and the repo lenders' willingness to fund the trade
to decrease. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Haircuts, FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis REV., Nov.-Dec.
2010, at 507, 512-516.
231 Hedge funds may also obtain leverage by borrowing securities (to short sell) or through synthetic
leverage structures. See JPMORGAN ALT. ASSET MGMT, supra note 10, at 1, 8-11.
232 See generally PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE
LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 7-10 (1999) (noting that hedge fund counterparties
manage their exposures to hedge funds through safeguards including due diligence, disclosure, collateral
practices, credit limits, and monitoring). The amount of credit extended in margin financing is typically
less than the market value of the collateral. For example, to invest in a position worth $10 million, a
hedge fund may only be required to post $6 million in cash, with the rest financed through a margin
loan. The percentage of the position that the lender requires the hedge fund to post is known as the initial
margin (or haircut) and increases with the perceived risk of the investment position or in the general
economy. The initial margin may increase over the life of a particular margin-financed transaction and is
also greater for borrowers considered to be more risky. BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, THE ROLE OF
MARGIN REQUIREMENTS AND HAIRCUTS IN PROCYCLICALITY 2 (2010); DAVID P. BELMONT, MANAGING
HEDGE FUND RISK AND FINANCING: ADAPTING TO A NEw ERA 124-25 (2011). In addition, additional
"variation margin" is typically required to be posted as the market value of the financed investment de-
creases (this is known as a margin call). LHABITANT, supra note 56, at 124-25. Hedge fund prime bro-
kers provide margin financing.
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creditors and counterparties took note of their stringent practices.233 When hedge
funds take excessive risks, it is often their creditors (not their equity investors) that
force them to close and liquidate their assets.234
In margin financing, hedge fund investment positions are evaluated and
marked-to-market on a daily basis by prime brokers; a fund must add additional mar-
gin to the extent that the investments' market value falls below a minimum threshold
level (maintenance margin). 23 5 Prime brokers have full transparency over the invest-
ment positions of hedge funds using their services 236 and are quick to terminate their
relationships with funds failing to comply with their risk management protocols.23 7
Prime brokers' relationships with hedge funds are also monitored by their own bank-
* 238ing or securities regulators.
Hedge fund repo counterparties are also generally prudent about their short-
term exposures to the funds and consider hedge funds among the riskiest type of
counterparties, such that the funds receive a larger haircut than other counterpar-
ties. 23 9 Hedge fund derivatives counterparties typically require the funds' trades to be
supported by substantial amounts of collateral. 24 0 Hedge fund derivatives transactions
require the fund to post margin (collateral) at the inception of the trade and to add
additional collateral if the market value of the trade decreases. The special discipline
imposed on hedge funds likely stems, in part, from the funds not being viewed as
"too big to fail" and, hence, as not being eligible for government aid if they pose sys-
temic risks to their creditors or counterparties.
233 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-667T, HEDGE FUNDS: OVERVIEW OF
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT, COUNTERPARTY RISKS, AND INVESTMENT CHALLENGES 30-32 (2008).
234 See JPMORGAN ALT. ASSET MGMT, supra note 10, at 15-16.
235 BELMONT, supra note 232.
236 LARS JAEGER, THE NEW GENERATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT FOR HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE
EQUITY INVESTMENTS 10 (2004).
237 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 233, at 30-31.
238 Id. at 23 ("Bank regulators (the Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC) monitor the risk management
practices of their regulated institutions' interactions with hedge funds as creditors and counterparties.");
Id. at 18 ("SEC also conducts oversight over hedge fund activities through the supervision of the regu-
lated securities firms that transact business with hedge funds as brokers, creditors, and counterparties.").
See also COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, OCC's QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES
ACTIVITIES FOURTH QUARTER 2008 5 (2008) (For U.S. commercial banks, "large credit exposures from
derivatives, whether from other dealers, large non-dealer banks or hedge funds, are collateralized on a
dail basis.").39 BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 232.
240 INT'L SWAPS & DERVIATIVES Ass'N, COUNTERPARTY CREDIT EXPOSURE AMONG MAJOR
DERIVATIVES DEALERS 8 (2007), available at http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdflISDA-Concentration-
Survey2007.pdf("[V]irtually all hedge fund exposures are more than fully collateralized with independ-
ent amounts posted up-front and variation margin posted subsequently as exposures change.").
Fall 2013 183
Stanford Journal ofLaw, Business & Finance
However, discipline by creditors and counterparties may be inadequate to
protect hedge fund investors. For example, hedge funds often use multiple prime
brokers to finance their positions, which prevents any single broker from knowing a
fund's total leverage.2 4 1 In addition, competition for hedge fund clients may lead
prime brokers to ease credit terms or fund oversight.242 Given prime borkers' experi-
ence during the financial crisis of 2008, these actual or potential inadequacies do not
seem substantial. Over a year before the financial crisis, and in response to Bear
Steams' collapse in March of 2008, prime brokers began to demand tighter credit
terms of hedge funds financing mortgage-related securities.243 Overall, hedge fund
leverage from prime brokers and other sources began to significantly decrease in
mid-2007, 24 likely due in part to the funds' own prudent risk management and the
discipline provided by hedge fund prime brokers, repo creditors, and derivatives
counterparties. As prime brokers' oversight of hedge funds has become more robust
since the collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in 1999, hedge
fund leverage has also decreased.24 5
The close monitoring of hedge funds by their short-term creditors and coun-
terparties is another distinguishing aspect of hedge fund governance. Private equity
funds, venture capital firms, and mutual funds typically use little to no short-term
leverage or derivatives. In addition, while corporations are certainly subject to disci-
pline by their creditors and counterparties, it likely is not as intense as it is with hedge
funds. Although corporations take on as much debt as hedge funds in total,246 it is
241 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 233, at 32.
242 FITCH RATINGS, HEDGE FUNDS: THE CREDIT MARKET'S NEW PARADIGM 4-5 (2007), available at
http://mountainmentorsassociates.com/files/Hedge Funds TheCreditMarket s New Paradigm Fitch
5 JuneO7.txt.pdf ("Most prime brokers agreed that there was continued pressure to provide more re-
laxed credit terms to funds - through higher leverage or other lending terms - due to growing compe-
tition to attract hedge fund clients."); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 233, at 33.
243 Gwen Robinson, Hedge Funds Face Subprime 'Haircut,' FTALPHAVILLE (July 6, 2007, 8:55
AM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2007/07/06/5715/hedge-funds-face-subprime-haircut/. See also Alistair
Barr, Hedge Funds Leaving Bear May Be Cutting Leverage, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 20, 2008),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hedge-funds-leaving-bear-may-be-facing-tougher-leverage-limits;
Deborah Brewster, US Banks Refuse to Accept Subprime Collateral, Fin. Times (Aug. 14, 2007),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/21097556-4ac8-1 Idc-95b5-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2rpKJGfMS.
244 Andrew Ang et al., Hedge Fund Leverage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 102, 119 (2011).
245 Michael R. King & Philipp Maier, Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: Regulating Prime Bro-
kers Will Mitigate Systemic Risks, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 283, 295 fig. 1 (2009).
246 See Ang et al., supra note 244, at 108 (estimating the mean gross leverage of hedge funds to be
2.13); Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan et al., Leverage Across Firms, Banks, and Countries 14 (Nat'l Bureau
ofEcon. Research, Working Paper No. 17354, 2012), available at
http://www.uh.edu/~bsorense/leverage feb28d_12.pdf ("Mean firm leverage for listed U.S. firms is ...
around 2.3-2.4 while the leverage ratio is slightly larger for non-listed firms.").
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from a mix of short-term and long-term sources, which does not provide the same
type of targeted monitoring of corporate assets and activities as does short-term-only
hedge fund debt. In addition, corporations that use short-term borrowing typically do
so on an unsecured basis, are financially stable, and use the short-term borrowings to
fund relatively safe working capital needs, such as making payroll and purchasing in-
ventory.247 Finally, corporations have access to permanent capital and, relative to
hedge funds, a wide variety of financing sources, which alleviates the need for in-
tense monitoring by any particular group of creditors.
D. Hedge Funds Produce Alpha
One way to assess whether hedge fund governance mechanisms are effective
in reducing managerial agency costs is to determine to what extent hedge funds pro-
duce superior returns, or alpha, relative to the stock market or other active investment
vehicles. This is because the production of alpha indicates that the creation of superi-
or returns, in comparison to those of alternatives, more than compensates for any
costs imposed upon hedge fund investors.
The best method for measuring hedge fund performance from an agency cost
perspective is to examine fund performance after fees are paid to managers,24 8 as op-
posed to measuring the actual returns earned by investors after adjusting for how they
invest in hedge funds.249 Most empirical studies of hedge fund returns, which are
247 See also Mark Jewell, Commercial Paper, What It Is and Why It Matters, SYRACUSE.COM (Oct.
7, 2008, 7:36 PM), http://blog.syracuse.com/indepth/2008/10/commercialpaper what it is an.htnl.
See generally Matthias Kahl et al., Why Do Firms Use Commercial Paper? (Dec. 15, 2010) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://ihome.cuhk.edu.hk/-bl2131 8/kahl-shivdasani-wang.pdf.
248 This approach is the known as the time-weighted (or geometric) rate of return. See HERBERT B.
MAYO, INVESTMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 359 (2010); see also Performance Calculations, ALBRIDGE,
http://resourcecenter.albridge.com/rc%20documents/Data%20Sheets/AWR/performancecalculations.pdf
(last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
249 This approach goes by various names such as the dollar- or money-weighted rate of return. See
MAYO, supra note 248, at 358-59; see also Performance Calculations, supra note 248. One study apply-
ing the dollar-weighted approach to hedge fund returns found that investors in hedge funds were worse
off than investing in the S&P 500 and only slightly better off than investing in the risk-free bond market.
See Dichev & Yu, supra note 143, at 261. The dollar-weighted measure of returns is not a good measure
for estimating agency costs because it incorporates how well hedge fund investors time their investments
into funds - something the manager has no fundamental control over. For a criticism of the dollar-
weighted approach, see generally Simon Hayley, Measuring Investors' Historical Returns: Hindsight
Bias in Dollar-Weighted Returns (March 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1698088. Another approach to measuring the returns actually earned by hedge
fund investors is that of financial economists Fung and Hsieh, who examine the returns to funds that in-
vest in hedge funds because such funds "are actual pools of hedge funds, and, as such, they directly re-
flect actual investment experience in hedge funds." William K.H. Fung & David A. Hsieh, Hedge
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based on the former approach, find that at least a significant portion of hedge funds
produce alpha. Numerous studies that analyzed hedge fund performance prior to the
financial crisis of 2008 find that hedge funds produce superior risk-adjusted returns
relative to traditional long-only investments.250 Studies covering hedge fund perfor-
mance throughout and after the financial crisis also find that hedge funds produce al-
pha.25 1 For example, a study of hedge fund performance from January 1994 to Sep-
Funds: An Industry in Its Adolescence, 91 ECON. REv. 1, 15 (2006). Studies of funds investing in hedge
funds are mixed but generally find that the funds produce alpha. See Yigit Atilgan, Reward-to-Risk Ra-
tios of Fund of Hedge Funds, in RECONSIDERING FUNDS OF HEDGE FUNDS: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND
BEST PRACTICES IN UCITS, TAIL RISK, PERFORMANCE, AND DUE DILIGENCE 275 (Greg N. Gregoriou ed.,
2012) ("find[ing] that the fund of funds index has higher reward-to-risk ratios compared to several stock
and bond market indices"); Raphacle Chappe et al., "Seeking Alpha": The Performance of Funds of
Hedge Funds, in RECONSIDERING FUNDS OF HEDGE FUNDS: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND BEST PRACTICES
IN UCITS, TAIL RISK, PERFORMANCE, AND DUE DILIGENCE 303 (Greg N. Gregoriou ed., 2012) (finding
that less than 10% of funds of hedge funds deliver alpha); Daniel Edelman et al., Funds of Hedge Funds:
Performance, Risk and Capital Formation 2005 to 2010, 26 FIN. MKTS. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 87, 87
(2012) (finding "a dramatic decline in the population of alpha producing funds of hedge funds post 2008
compared to the FHNR findings"); Fung et. al, supra note 142, at 1779 (finding that hedge fund-of-
funds delivered alpha only in the period between October 1998 and March 2000); Thomas Heidorn et
al., The Risk of Funds of Hedge Funds: An Empirical Analysis of the Maximum Drawdown, 12 J.
WEALTH MGMT. 89, 89 (2009) ("the advantages of FHFs are more likely to be in their low long-term
correlations with traditional asset classes, as well as in their low volatility"); Serge Darolles & Mathieu
Vaissid, Do Funds of Hedge Funds Really Add Value? A 'Post' Crisis Analysis 2 (Sept. 20, 2010) (un-
published manuscript), available at, http://ssm.com/abstract=1670571 ("[F]unds of hedge funds appear
to succeed in overcoming their double fee structure, and add value across market regimes, although to
varying degrees and in different forms."); Benoit Dewaele et al., Assessing the Performance of Funds of
Hedge Funds 1 (Oct. 9, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1929097
("[W]e find that, after fees, the majority of FoHFs do not channel alpha from single manag-
er hedge funds.").
250 See Vigdis Boasson & Emil Boasson, Risk and Returns of Hedge Funds Investment Strategies, 8
INv. MGMT. FIN. INNOVATIONS 110, 110 (2011); Daniel Capocci & Georges Hubner, Analysis of Hedge
Fund Performance, 11 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 55, 77 (2004) (finding that hedge funds as a whole "[d]eliver
significant excess returns"); Bill Ding & Hany A. Shawky, The Performance of Hedge Fund Strategies
and the Asymmetry of Return Distributions, 13 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 309, 329 (2007) (finding that, from
1990 to 2003, all hedge fund categories achieved above average performance when measured against an
aggregate equity market index); Robert Kosowski et al., Do Hedge Funds Deliver Alpha? A Bayesian
and Bootstrap Analysis, 84 J. FIN. EcoN. 229, 262-63 (2007). See generally Harry M. Kat & Joelle Mif-
fre, The Impact of Non-Normality Risks and Tactical Trading on Hedge Fund Alphas, 10 J. ALT.
INVESTMENTS 8 (2008) (finding that representative hedge fund managers have superior trading skills but
notinp that previous studies and their own may overstate alpha).
25 See, e.g., Shuang Feng, A Comparison of Hedge Fund Gross and Net Performance 10-12 (Sept.
16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1929213 (finding hedge fund
performance from January 1994 to April 2010 produced alpha and no evidence that alpha had been de-
creasing); see also Roger G. Ibbotson et al., The A,B,Cs of Hedge Funds: Alphas, Betas, and Costs, 67
FIN. ANALYSIS J. 15, 23 (2011) (finding that hedge funds returns from January 1995 through December
2009 have an annual net-of-fees alpha averaging 3%). See generally Andrea J. Heuson & Mark
Hutchinson, Which Hedge Fund Managers Deliver Alpha? (March 15, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1786547 (finding positive alpha using a novel performance meas-
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tember 2008 found that most hedge fund investment strategies returned alpha and
that alpha did not decrease on an industry-wide level over that time. 2 52 Another study
of hedge fund returns, which included data regarding over 20,000 funds from January
1994 to December 2010, found significant hedge fund alpha of 5.2% per year (using
the study's most conservative estimate).2 53 Two additional studies of hedge fund re-
turns, each using a dataset from January 1994 to December 2011, found that hedge
funds outperformed stock and bond markets. 25 4 Most studies that do not find hedge
fund alpha are limited to small and unrepresentative fund pools.2 5 5
In addition to outperforming on a stand-alone basis, numerous studies find
that hedge funds can help to diversify, and hence improve the performance of, a tra-
ditional investment portfolio of stocks and bonds.2 56 For example, a study of success-
ful university endowments attributed their superior investment returns in part to their
hedge fund investments.257 These findings are the most important for hedge fund in-
vestors, since most investors include hedge funds as a part of broader investment
portfolio. These studies strongly indicate that the typical hedge fund, or at least a sig-
nificant portion of the funds, provide unique value to investors by helping them to
improve their returns.
IV. Improving Hedge Fund Governance
A. Governance and Firm Characteristics
As investors seek to improve hedge fund governance, they should attempt to
strike the right balance between governance devices that empower managerialism
ure for hedge funds from 1994 to October or September 2009).
252 Manuel Ammann et al., Has Hedge Fund Alpha Disappeared? 3-4 (Sept. 24, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1 532742.
253 Juha Joenv55ra et al., New 'Stylized Facts' About Hedge Funds and Database Selection Bias 3
Oct. 25, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-i989410.
254 CTR. FOR HEDGE FUND RESEARCH, supra note 26, at 4-10; Turan G. Bali et al., Do Hedge Funds
Outperform Stocks and Bonds? 2 (Sept. 20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract--2055507 (finding several hedge fund strategies outperformed the stock market
and that almost all types of hedge funds outperformed the bond market on a long-term basis). See also
Schneeweis & Kazemi, supra note 26, at 8 (finding that fund performance "results [from 1998 to 2010]
show the benefit of hedge funds to the average investor").
255 Dichev & Yu, supra note 143, at 250.
256 See, e.g., Wolfgang Bessler et al., Hedge Funds and Optimal Asset Allocation: Bayesian Expec-
tations and Spanning Tests, 26 FIN. MKTS. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 109, 136-138 (2012).
257 See generally Josh Lerner et al., Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of University Endowment
Success (Harvard Bus. Sch. Fin., Working Paper No. 07-066, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1027450.
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and those that provide investor protection. There are likely several baseline corporate
governance devices that, if adopted, would help strike the right balance and lead to
better returns for all hedge fund investors. Such governance devices include a sub-
stantial level of transparency, some type of performance-based compensation, and
effective operational controls.
However, beyond a baseline set of general governance devices, there is likely
no universal set of specific governance mechanisms (e.g., fee rates, redemption terms)
that will optimize investor returns for investors in all hedge funds. This is because, as
empirical corporate governance research indicates, whether a particular governance
mechanism is associated with better performance depends on the specific economic
characteristics of the firm.258 Hedge funds pursue an extremely wide variety of in-
vestment strategies and hence have a wide range of economic characteristics.
Accordingly, the adoption of any governance mechanisms often involves
tradeoffs related to the firm's characteristics. In the hedge fund context, these gov-
ernance-relevant characteristics include the horizon of the fund's investment strategy,
the strategy's risk and return properties (including its correlation with broader mar-
kets), and the redemption terms provided to investors. Improving the governance of a
hedge fund, therefore, requires considering any inherent tradeoffs involved in choos-
ing a particular governance device and the fund's governance-relevant characteristics.
For example, reducing the redemption restrictions of a fund with a relatively long-
term investment horizon may, at some point, interfere with the ability of the manager
to carry out the fund's strategy.
B. Fees
1. Performance-Based Compensation and Rate
There is a general tradeoff in paying managers performance-based fees. Per-
formance fees may benefit investors to the extent that they incentivize managers to
improve their performance and attract higher talented managers to the industry.
However, performance fees are also a cost to investors, in that they are deducted
258 See Philip Brown et al., Corporate Governance, Accounting and Finance: A Review, 51 AccT.
FIN. 96, 118 (2011) ("The consensus view in the literature is that the relationship between firm perfor-
mance and [corporate governance] is endogenous and may depend on other (unobserved) firm character-
istics as well .... Overall, research that takes the endogenous relationship into account finds at best only
weak support for the proposition that better [corporate governance] practices create value.").
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from increases in the value of their assets. 259 Empirical evidence supports the theory
that performance-based compensation improves investors' net-of-fee returns. Studies
find that hedge fund performance fees, in part, account for their outperformance of
mutual funds (which by law cannot charge asymmetric performance fees) 26 0 and that
private investment funds that do not charge performance fees underperform those that
do.261 In addition, most studies examining the issue find that hedge funds that charge
higher performance fees have better returns.2 62 Charging higher performance fees
(and lower management fees) may also serve as a signal to investors of superior
managerial ability.2 63
259 Goetzmann et al., supra note 210, at 1704-05 (discussing formal conditions under which per-
formance fees are justified).
260 See generally Carl Ackermann et al., The Performance ofHedge Funds: Risk, Return, and Incen-
tives, 54 J. FIN. 833 (1999) (finding that in a sample of funds from 1988-1995, hedge funds consistently
outperformed mutual funds in part because of incentive fees); Bing Liang, On the Performance of Hedge
Funds, 55 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 72 (1999) (finding that hedge funds exhibit superior risk-adjusted returns as
com ared to mutual funds).
Cecile Le Moigne & Patrick Savaria, Relative Importance of Hedge Fund Characteristics, 20
FIN. MKTS. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 419, 424 (2006). But see Roy Kouwenberg & William T. Ziemba, Incen-
tives andRisk-Taking in Hedge Funds, 31 J. BANKING FIN. 3291, 3308 (2007) (finding that "hedge funds
with incentive fees have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees) and worse risk-adjusted perfor-
mance").
262 See generally Ackermann et al., supra note 260 (finding average hedge fund returns positively
related to performance fees); Hung-Gay Fung et al., Global Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and Market
Timing, 58 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19 (2002) (finding average hedge fund returns positively related to perfor-
mance fees for a sample of 115 equity funds from 1994 to 2000); William Fung & David A. Hsieh,
Hedge-Fund Benchmarks: Information Content and Biases, 58 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 22 (2002); Liang, su-
pra note 260 (finding average hedge fund returns positively related to performance fees); Gokce
Soydemir et al., supra note 214 ("Funds that charge a high performance fee appear to outperform those
that charge a relatively low fee."); Press Release, Preqin, Hedge Funds With Highest Performance Fees
Deliver Best Net Returns (Aug. 29, 2013), available at
https://www.preqin.com/docs/press/Hedge Fund FeesAugl3.pdf. Some studies find no relationship
between incentive fee rate and performance. See generally Stephen J. Brown et al., Offshore Hedge
Funds: Survival and Performance 1989-1995, 72 J. Bus. 91 (1999) (finding no relationship between
incentive fee rates and performance); Thomas Schneeweis et al., Understanding Hedge Fund. Perfor-
mance: Research Issues Revisited: Part 1, 5 J. ALTERNATIVE INvestment 6 (2002) (finding little relation-
ship between performance fees and returns in a group of long/short equity funds). The evidence is also
mixed regarding the impact of performance fees on hedge fund survival, although no study finds that
funds with higher incentive fees and high-water marks have an increased probability of failure. BARTH
ET AL., supra note 59, at 63-64 (finding that funds with higher management and performance fees are
less likely to fail); Guillermo Baquero et al., Survival, Look-Ahead Bias and the Performance of Hedge
Funds, 40 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 493, 504 (2005) ("[T]he higher the incentive fee, ceteris
paribus, the more likely it is that the fund will liquidate in the next quarter."); Naohiko Baba & Hi-
romichi Goko, Survival Analysis of Hedge Funds 27 (Bank of Japan Working Paper Series, Paper No.
06-E-05, 2006) (finding funds with higher performance fees are less likely to be operational).
263 See generally Prachi Deuskar et al., The Dynamics of Hedge Fund Fees (March 15, 2013) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1659275; Ramadorai & Streatfield, supra
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Accordingly, investors' desires for lower fees should be tempered by the po-
tential for higher fees to induce greater (and more skilled) managerial effort. Alt-
hough lower fees may increase the portion of returns allocated investors, they may
also decrease the incentives for managers to expend the kind of effort required to
produce better returns. Higher fees may also allow a hedge fund to attract and retain
higher skilled managers. Thus, a combination of high performance fees and low
management fees may be optimal for investors.
Investors should also focus on having performance-fee compensation match
the time horizon of the manager's investment strategy. Doing so would prevent man-
agers from getting paid in the short run while investors suffer losses in the long run.
It would also allow investors to make more informed decisions regarding which
managers are able to consistently perform well over time, compared to those that are
lucky in the short run. 264 Moving towards a multi-year compensation structure for
managers may be a significant area for improvement. Currently, less than an estimat-
ed 10% of hedge funds measure manager performance over multi-year periods.265
However, nearly a quarter of hedge funds pursue investment strategies that likely ex-
tend past an annual period and, hence, should most likely adopt a multi-year perfor-
266mance fee measure.
One way of accomplishing a better intertemporal alignment may be to im-
plement a rolling and deferred performance fee arrangement that calculates perfor-
mance fees over a multi-year period to match the actual realized gains from an in-
vestment strategy.267 Another method would be to place a portion of the annual
performance fees in an escrow account allowing investors to clawback and retrieve
the fees if there is underperformance in subsequent years.268
2. High-Water Marks and Hurdle Rates
With respect to high-water marks, empirical studies have found that funds
with high-water marks perform better than those without, which suggests that man-
note 142 (finding that hedge funds that recently outperformed their peers start new funds with higher
management and performance fees).
264 See Cusworth, supra note 178 ("Calculating performance fees over longer periods would make
the market more efficient at pricing hedge fund talent.").
265 See SEWARD & KISSEL LLP, supra note 179, at 2.
266 See INEICHEN, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that 24.6% of hedge funds pursue "event driven" strat-
egies including investing around mergers and acquisitions and in illiquid distressed debt instruments).
267 QUIRK & BANK OF N.Y. MELLON, supra note 2, at 32-33; UTAH RET. Sys., supra note 177, at 2.
268 See DONDE, supra note 4, at 33-35.
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agers respond positively to the incentive. Using a sample of 8,752 hedge funds from
January 1990 to December 2005, Chakraborty and Ray found that high-water marks
seemed to induce managers at or just below the mark to expend more effort.2 6 9 High-
water marks have generally been found to reduce the incentive of managers to in-
crease risk after performing poorly, due to their aversion to falling even further below
the mark.27 0 High-water marks also create incentives for managers to close or contin-
ue to operate poorly performing funds based on what is in the investors' best inter-
est.27 'Excessive risk-taking has been found in empirical and theoretical studies to be
constrained by a desire to prevent the fund from collapsing, the loss of co-invested
funds, or a fall far below the high-water mark in the first place.272 Using a sample of
4,990 hedge funds from January 1994 through December 2007, Andrew Clare and
Nick Motson found that hedge fund managers well below their high-water mark do
not "put it all on black" and increase their risk-taking activities, even though they
may jeopardize earning performance fees.273
However, there is evidence that compensating a manager with an annual per-
formance fee subject to a high-water mark may also cause an incentive misalignment
between investors and managers when a fund's performance drops significantly be-
low its high-water mark. In these situations, earning a performance fee requires a
substantial gain by the end of the year, thereby giving the manager an incentive to
substantially increase risk because coming in at, just below, or far below the high-
269 Indraneel Chakraborty & Sugata Ray, Effort, Risk and Walkaway Under High Water Mark Style
Contracts 2, 20 (Mar. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1083089. See also Agarwal et al., supra note 224, at 2225 (finding that "funds
with high-water mark provisions produce higher returns").
270 Aragon & Nanda, supra note 220.
271 Ruckes & Sevostiyanova, supra note 221, at 2-3, 15.272 See Stavros Panageas & Mark M. Westerfield, High-Water Marks: High Risk Appetites? Convex
Compensation, Long Horizons, and Portfolio Choice, J. FIN. 4, 14-15 (2009) (arguing that a desire to
avoid falling below the high-water mark restrains hedge fund manager risk-taking); see generally James
E. Hodder & Jens C. Jackwerth, Incentive Contracts and Hedge Fund Management, 42 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 811 (2007) (arguing that managerial co-investment induces managers to re-
duce risk as fund value fall below the high-water mark); Serge Amvella, Managerial Incentives and the
Risk-Taking Behavior of Hedge Fund Managers (July 20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1652306 (developing a model which indicates that hedge fund managers will
not take excessive risk given the path-dependent nature of the payoffs); Neng Wang et al., The Econom-
ics of Hedge Funds (Sept. 6, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2024669 (developing a model which indicates that "managerial concern for
fund survival induces the manager to choose prudent leverage").
273 See generally Andrew Clare & Nick Motson, Locking in the Profits or Putting it All on Black?
An Investigation into the Risk-Taking Behaviour of Hedge Fund Managers 12 J. ALT. INVESTMENTS 7
(2009).
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water mark will all result in the manager not being paid a performance fee.274 There
is evidence of this "swing for the fences" effect: one study found that returns for
funds 10% below their high-water mark were more volatile than those at the mark,
and funds further from the high-water mark took more and relatively poorer risks.2 75
Yet another found evidence that, as hedge funds fall below their high-water mark,
they increase risk, have lower expected risk-adjusted returns, and are more likely to
close due to inability to ever recover losses to get "above water" (and hence allow
managers to be paid performance fees).276 For this reason, industry commentators
have called for abolishing high-water marks altogether.277
High-water marks may also reduce returns in another way. Hedge fund man-
agers have an incentive to reduce their risk-taking after surpassing a high-water mark
to lock-in profits. By doing so, managers may deprive investors of the forgone gains
from the manager pursuing the same strategy that allowed them to surpass the high-
water mark in the first place.278
Hedge fund investors should accordingly consider investing in funds that
have attractive characteristics but do not use high-water marks or in funds that re-
move or reset their high-water marks if the fund drops substantially below the mark.
The latter will remove the incentive for managers taking on undue risks to reach the
high-water mark and prevent employees from leaving a fund that is substantially un-
der water.
Although hurdle rates are relatively uncommon, the higher the performance
fee, the lower the management fee, or the lower the leverage, the more likely the fund
will use them.2 7 9 Soydemir, Smolarskiand, and Shin argue that hurdle rates are of-
fered in an attempt to compensate investors for investing in certain funds they find
relatively risky or otherwise unattractive from a risk-return standpoint.280 The authors
view hurdle rates primarily as marketing tools, however, because they find no corre-
lation between fund performance and offering a hurdle.2 8 1
274 New Research Illustrates Wide-ranging Implications of the Ubiquitous "High Water Mark,"
ALLABoUTALPHA.COM (Jan. 21. 2008), http://allaboutalpha.com/blog/2008/01/21/new-research-
illustrates-wide-ranging-implications-of-the-ubiquitous-high-water-mark/.
275 See Chakraborty & Ray, supra note 269.
276 See generally Sugata Ray, The Downside of High Water Marks: An Empirical Study (Mar. 22,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1476372.
27 QuIRK & BANK OF N.Y. MELLON, supra note 2, at 29, 33-34.
278 Clare & Motson, supra note 273.
279 Gokce Soydemir et al., supra note 214, at 18.
280 Id. at 12-13.
281 Id. at 15-17.
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Hurdle rates are most likely to benefit investors in hedge funds whose returns
are highly correlated to stock, bond, or other broad markets.28 Accordingly, investors
should probably only demand hurdle rates in funds that run the risk of providing the
same risk-adjusted returns as a cheaper, passive investment vehicle (such as a stock
index). Investors should also consider having the hurdle rate be based upon a speci-
fied level of correlation, instead of an absolute level of return. 28 3 That way, investors
will not have to pay fees for returns that they sought to avoid by investing in hedge
funds in the first place (i.e., returns correlated with broader markets).
3. Managerial Co-Investment
Managerial co-investment unsurprisingly seems to align incentives and in-
crease performance. A study by Agarwal et al. of a representative sample of 7,535
hedge funds from 1995 to 2004 found a positive and statistically significant relation-
ship between co-investment and performance.284 Other researchers have also found
that managerial co-investment overcomes incentive misalignments that may arise
when managers are paid only based on a performance-based fee constrained by a
high-water mark or hurdle rate.2 85 Co-investment may also increase the incentives for
28
managers to close poorly performing funds when doing so is best for investors.286 Af
ter taking into account the incentives facing hedge fund managers from a wide varie-
ty of factors, Agarwal et al. found that hedge funds perform better when overall in-
centives are higher - in the presence of higher performance fees, more managerial
co-investment into the fund, and higher high-water marks.2 87
Nonetheless, there is likely a governance tradeoff with co-investment. Co-
investment beyond a certain level may decrease performance to the extent that high
282 QUIRK & BANK OF N.Y. MELLON, supra note 2, at 33; Beer, supra note 26.
283 Houman B. Shadab, Correlation: The New Hedge Fund Hurdle, LAWBITRAGE (Nov. 23, 2011,
6:02 PM), http://lawbitrage.typepad.com/blog/2011/11/correlation-the-new-hedge-fund-hurdle.html.284 Agarwal et al., supra note 269 at 2224-25; see also Le Moigne & Savaria, supra note 261, at 424
(finding, in a sample of 3,775 funds from 1989 to 2005, that funds with the personal capital of managers
invested had higher returns).
285 Gong Zhan, Manager Fee Contracts and Managerial Incentives, 14 REv. DERIVATIVES RES. 205,
226 (2011).286 Ruckes & Sevostiyanova, supra note 221.
287 Agarwal et al., supra note 269, at 2224-25; see also Liang, supra note 262, at 74 (finding that
funds with high-water marks outperformed funds without them). In a separate study, Agarwal et al.
found that hedge fund managers with higher incentives and opportunities to artificially manage their
earnings may be doing so to improve performance results. Vikas Agarwal et al., Why is Santa So Kind to
Hedge Funds? The December Return Puzzle! 1-3 (Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 07-09,
2007), available at http://www.econbiz.de/archiv/k/uk/ifinanzmarkt/why issanta.pdf.
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co-investment could result in the fund manager becoming too cautious.288 Although
the optimal range of co-investment is an issue yet to be analyzed in-depth, investors
should require managers to make at least some significant amount of co-investment,
including requiring managers to reinvest profits into the fund to help assure long-
term incentive alignment.
C. Transparency
Transparency in the hedge fund context refers to the extent and frequency of
disclosures about a fund's or manager's performance, operations, and structure. Even
prior to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which effectively mandated that all hedge fund
managers publicly disclose information on Form ADV, the typical established fund
disclosed a significant amount of information about its investments, performance,
and other characteristics. 289 However, the level of transparency differed significantly
among hedge funds and ranged from funds providing only summary statistics of re-
turns to full, position-level transparency. 290 Since the 2008 financial crisis, investors
have demanded more transparency and hedge funds have responded by increasing
their disclosures and reporting. Nonetheless, investor surveys indicate that transpar-
ency remains a top concern.29 1
Investors can generally make more informed investment decisions with more
frequent and expansive hedge fund disclosures. Greater disclosures will also likely
lower a hedge fund's cost of capital and increase the liquidity of its shares in second-
ary markets, by giving investors more information about the fund and the manager's
activities. However, there are some nuances that qualify the "more-transparency-is-
better" principle. The first is that investors may suffer from information overload and
be unable to process the vast amount of information effectively. 29 3 For example,
288 Kouwenberg & Ziemba, supra note 261, at 3307 (concluding that "if the manager's own stake in
the fund is substantial (e.g. > 30%), risk taking will be reduced considerably"). See also LHABITANT,
supra note 56, at 33 (noting that "a successful fund manager at the end of his [or her] career will have so
large a commitment in the fund that he [or she] will refrain from taking risks, even though these are well
remunerated").289 Email from Gibney & Leu, supra note 174.
290 FRANK J. TRAVERS, INVESTMENT MANAGER ANALYSIS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO PORTFOLIO
SELECTION, MONITORING AND OPTIMIZATION 371 (2011)
291 KPMG, TRANSFORMATION: THE FUTURE OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS 5 (2010).
292 See Christian Luez & Peter D. Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and
Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research 8-10, 27-31 (Mar. 2008) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract- 1105398.
293 See FRAN'OIS-SERGE LHABITANT, HEDGE FUNDS: QUANTITATIVE INSIGHTS 18 (2004). See gener-
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complete transparency into a fund's specific investment positions may be over-
whelming and may not provide a basis for investors to make a meaningful compari-
294
son between managers. Even sophisticated investors may have difficulty distin-
guishing between the unique aspects of different hedge fund disclosures.295 For hedge
funds that hold illiquid securities or complex instruments, transparency into the
fund's investment positions is unlikely to give investors significant insight into the
fund's investment strategy due to the numerous potential ways the manager may be
seeking to profit from the relationship between the positions. 29 6 Periodic short-term
disclosures (e.g., weekly) about the investment positions in long-term strategies are
also unlikely to offer investors much value. The fact that investors typically do not
seek full position-level disclosures from managers or require managers to report per-
formance in a way that mitigates performance-smoothing suggests that, beyond a cer-
tain point, additional transparency is not necessarily beneficial. 2 9 7
In addition, at some point, greater disclosures may erode a manager's com-
petitive advantage and, hence, decrease returns.2 98 If another investor or trader ob-
tains knowledge about a hedge fund's investment positions, the competitor may be
able to enter into offsetting trades that reduce the value of the fund's investments.299
A related issue is what information about the fund is most important to inves-
tors when making investment decisions. Sophisticated hedge fund investors already
have well-defined preferences regarding what information and level of transparency
they seek.300 In addition, a large practitioner literature exists on hedge fund disclo-
sures and typically differentiates between what information investors should look for
ally Troy A. Parades, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003).
294 See ScoTT SOMERVILLE & TYLER KIM, MAPLES FUND SERVICES, TRANSCENDING TRANSPARENCY
4-5 Q2012).2 5 See Pat Hayes, Defining Hedge Fund Transparency-The Challenge of Balancing Risk Man-
agement and Alpha Generation, ST. STREET (Sept. 21, 2011).
296 See Richard Bookstaber, Hedge Fund Existential, 59 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 19, 19-23 (2003); see
generally Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013) (arguing that even sophisticated investors may fail to properly examine disclosures regarding
complex investments), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2168427.
297 See Felix Golitz & David Schroder, Hedge Fund Transparency: Where Do We Stand?, 12 J.
ALT. INVESTMENTS 20, 20-35 (2010).
298 See generally George 0. Aragon et al., Why Do Hedge Funds Avoid Disclosure? Evidence From
Confidential 13F Filings, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2014); Sitikantha Parida &
Terence Teo, The Impact of More Frequent Portfolio Disclosure on Mutual Fund Performance (June 22,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2097883.
29 See Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse H. Pedersen, Predatory Trading, 60 J. FIN. 1825, 1825-26
(2005).300 See supra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
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prior to making an investment (due diligence) and what should be the subject of their
ongoing monitoring, once they have invested with a fund.30 1 Studies by financial
economists also suggest that investors should focus on a particular fund's risk, in-
cluding operational risk.302 In particular, investors should focus on disclosures about
the uniqueness of the fund's investment strategy and its lack of correlation with broad
market risk factors.303
The foregoing analysis of transparency suggests that hedge fund investors
should not seek real-time, position-level disclosure across the board or for every type
of fund. Rather, investors should focus on disclosures that provide the right level and
frequency of meaningful information about the manager's strategy, investment risks,
and operational controls.
D. Hedge Fund Boards of Directors
Investors should be skeptical of the value of boards in hedge funds. In the
corporate context, boards provide value due to shareholder capital lock-in. Because
equity investors in corporations make a permanent contribution of capital to the firm,
a board is needed to oversee management to ensure that the capital is used produc-
tively.304 In the hedge fund context, by contrast, investor capital is not locked-in and
can be redeemed at any time, subject to relatively short-term and limited redemption
restrictions. As a result, hedge fund investors may not need an intermediary board to
protect their interests, since they can protect themselves by simply cashing out of the
fund.305 This likely explains why 85% of the hedge funds based in North America do
not have boards and why there is no evidence that funds with boards perform better
than those without them.
Likewise, investors in hedge funds with boards should hesitate before pres-
suring managers to adopt governance characteristics that appear to serve their inter-
301 See, e.g., TRAVERS, supra note 290; see also LHABITANT, supra note 56, at 569-78.
302 See generally Keith H. Black, Preventing and Detecting Hedge Fund Failure Risk Through Par-
tial Transparency, 12 DERIVATIVES USE, TRADING & REG. 330 (2007); Stephen J. Brown, Quantitative
Measures of Operational Risk: An Application to Funds Management, 52 ACCT. & FIN. 1001 (2012).
303 See generally Sheridan Titman & Cristian Tiu, Do the Best Hedge Funds Hedge?, 24 REv. FIN.
STUD. 123 (2010); Zheng Sun et al., The Road Less Traveled: Strategy Distinctiveness and Hedge Fund
Performance, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 96 (2012).
3 See Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 261 (2005).
305 See also Jerry W. Markham, Mutual Fund Scandals-A Comparative Analysis of the Role of
Corporate Governance in the Regulation of Collective Investments, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 67, 154 (2006)
("[H]edge funds have conflicts of interest but have dealt with them adequately without a mandated
number of outside directors.").
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ests. Empirical studies of corporate governance do not find that "good governance,"
including director independence, increases performance.306 Hedge funds may be par-
ticularly ill-served by independent directors because the funds' investment strategy
and risks are relatively difficult for outsiders, such as independent directors, to under-
stand.307 Nonetheless, one study of hedge fund boards found that, for funds that do
have boards, (risk adjusted) performance is better where boards are independent and
308directors have with risk management experience. Investors should, accordingly,
approach the reform of any particular hedge fund board on a case-by-case basiS. 309
Compensating hedge fund directors with equity interests in the fund as a way to align
incentives should be considered, due to its association with better performance in
public companies. 310 Alternatively, compensating directors with structured notes tied
to the performance of the director's fund may be another way to align the director's
incentives.3 11
Investors should be mindful that their efforts to reform hedge fund boards
might also be problematic given that governing financial institutions seems particu-
larly problematic. Due to the inherent complexity of the financial world, reliance on
boards to monitor managers in banks has proven to be an ineffective model of gov-
ernance. 3 12 Heavily regulated mutual fund boards also seem generally ineffective in
furthering investors' interests and introduce their own layer of agency costs into gov-
ernance. 313 A hedge fund board may do little more than create a false sense of securi-
ty among investors and may impose significant costs. 3 14
306 See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 910-11 (2007).
307 See Ran Duchin, John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, When Are Outside Directors Effective?,
96 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 195 (2010) ("[W]hen the cost of information [about a firm] is high, performance
worsens when outsiders are added to the board.").
308 See generally Peter G. Szilagyi & Chong Wei Wong, The Board of Directors in Hedge Fund
Governance, (Dec. 17, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2013conference/program/retrieve.php?pdfid=412.
309 See generally CASTLE HALL ALTS. & SELECT FUND SERVS., REDEFINING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR HEDGE FUND DIRECTORS (2012).
310 See Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Effect of Corporate Governance on Performance, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESIS OF THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 97, 118-19 (H. Kent Baker & Ronald
Anderson eds., 2010).
311 For an overview of structured hedge fund products see generally PIRMIN STUTZER, STRUCTURED
HEDGE FUND PRODUCTS (2006), available at
http://db.riskwaters.com/global/events[FLAGSHIPS/sppb2006/presentations/masterclass_pirmin-stutzer
.pdf.
312 See Hussein Tarraf, Literature Review on Corporate Governance and the Recent Financial Crisis
14-16 (Dec. 27, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1731044.
313 See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Liti-
gation Don't Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 123-26, 136 (2010); see also Anita Krug, In-
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However, none of the foregoing suggests that hedge fund investors should be
the primary or direct monitors of hedge fund managers. Instead of relying on a board,
investors should require funds to establish committees relevant to their areas of con-
cern and rely on independent third-party service providers for monitoring. This is be-
cause internal committees can discipline a fund to commit to pre-established policies
and procedures and are more focused on specific issues, as opposed to a wide variety
of governance tasks. In addition, third-party service providers have their own reputa-
tional incentives to provide a check on managers and are likely to be in a better posi-
tion to effectively do so. 3 15 For example, when it comes to the important issue of val-
uing fund assets, a valuation committee can establish applicable valuation policies
and procedures and address conflicts of interests in doing so. 3 16 In addition, third-
party administrators should be hired to conduct their own valuation of fund assets, to
the extent possible. So long as practices ensure that administrators are independent
from managers, administrators can provide investors with valuations that are free
from conflicts of interests, a signal that managers are committed to accurate report-
ing, and a valuable "second opinion" when reliance on the manager to value illiquid
assets is necessary. 3 17 Relying on service providers has become more commercially
vestment Company as Instrument: The Limitations of the Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm,
86 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 278-89 (2013) (arguing that mutual fund managers have incentives to keep in-
formation from directors and that directors are insufficiently independent); Markham, supra note 305, at
153 (concluding that the "the use of outside directors to guard against conflicts of interest on the part of
investment advisers to mutual funds has proven to be ineffective"). See generally Alan R. Palmiter, Mu-
tual Fund Boards: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, I BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
161 (2006) (arguing that mutual fund boards are overly reliant on management and not subject to proper
oversight).
314 Deborah Prutzman, A Hedge Fund Board is Not a Magic Bullet, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR'S
ALPHA (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.institutionalinvestorsalpha.com/Article/3133058/Blogs/A-Hedge-
Fund-Board-Is-Not-a-Magic-Bullet.html. See also James Tinworth, Hedge fund Governance Part Two:
The Future of the Fund Board (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-dcaae9fe-c2e4-4d76-9355-1f9e4e906cO2 ("[E]ven if the
necessary improvements are made, investors need to appreciate the legal, fiscal and practical limitations
on a fund's board.").
315 See QUIRK & BANK OF N.Y. MELLON, supra note 2, at 16.
316 See ASSET MANAGERS' COMM. TO PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 33, at
14-21.
317 See generally NAVIGANT CAPITAL ADVISORS, THE GROWING MANDATE FOR INDEPENDENCE IN
ILLIQUID ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT VALUATION (2012), available at
http://www.navigant.com/-/media/VWW/Site/Insights/Corporate%20Finance/GrowingMandateforI
ndependence%20FINAL.ashx; see also HOULIHAN LOKEY, INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY VALUATION
INSIGHTS, available at http://www.hl.com/email/pdf/ValuationBestPractices International.pdf; Banzaca,




feasible due to innovations that have reduced their cost and increased their ability to
318
integrate into a fund's operations.
E. Redemption Restrictions
Although redemption restrictions may impose agency costs on investors to
the extent they do not help a fund's performance, 1 they may also allow investors to
access funds with higher returns. In general, relatively long-term, illiquid investment
strategies are a source of higher returns because such strategies are offered at a dis-
count to compensate investors for giving up the ability to quickly exit the invest-
ment.3 20 Long-term investment strategies may also allow investors to access unique
sources of value not present in more widely available, short-term investment strate-
gies. As a result, investors in hedge funds with illiquid strategies are compensated for
illiquidity risk with higher returns. 32 1 Illiquid hedge fund investment strategies may
be undermined with frequent investor redemptions, however, because illiquid in-
vestments require more time to realize gains than do liquid investments. Indeed, em-
pirical studies confirm that investors generally benefit when hedge funds use redemp-
tion restrictions that allow managers to realize gains from illiquid investments. 3 22
Lockups may also have the benefit of preventing a fund from collapsing due to tem-
porary poor returns, as they give managers enough time to recover losses. 3 23
318 See PALADYNE, OUTSOURCING TRENDS IN THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 9-10, available at
http://www.paladyne.com/wp-content/white-papers/Outsourcing-Trends-in-the-Hedge-Fund-
Industry.pdf.
319 See supra Part II.D.
320 This discount is reflected in the well-documented "illiquidity premium" in financial markets.
Amir E. Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, Illiquidity Premia in Asset Returns: An Empirical Analysis of
Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, and U.S. Equity Portfolios 3-6 (June 25, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssnr.com/absract=14254954.
321 See generally Agarwal et al., supra note 224, at 2234-35; see also Ronnie Sadka, Hedge-Fund
Performance and Liquidity Risk (Apr. 27, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1917118; Nic Schaub & Markus Schmid, Hedge Fund Liquidity and Perfor-
mance: Evidence from the Financial Crisis (Sept. 21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-2150182.
322 George A. Aragon, Share Restrictions and Asset Pricing: Evidence from the Hedge Fund Indus-
try, 8 J. FIN. EcON. 33, 34 (2007). See also generally Phelim Boyle et al., Hedge Fund Redemption Re-
strictions, Financial Crisis, and Fund Performance (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://efmaefm.org/OEFMSYMPOSIUM/Toronto-20 11/papers/Paper Nov08_2010 withtables.pdf;
Schaub & Schmid, supra note 321.
323 See generally Guillaume Simon, Does Lockup Increase Hedge Funds Lifetimes? 2 (June 3,
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://gsimon.edu.free.fr/cariboost-files/Does 20Lockup 201nfluence_20IF20Lifetimes.pdf .
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Accordingly, investors should be willing to accept redemption restrictions,
324when doing so is consistent with the goals of a long-term investment strategy. 3I
vestors should not to place too high a value on liquidity given that the premium in-
vestors receive for accepting restrictions on withdrawals is likely one of the main rea-
sons why hedge funds outperform other investments.325 In addition, the development
of increasingly liquid secondary markets for hedge fund shares should decrease the
importance of short-term liquidity because a secondary market provides investors
with an additional means of exit.
F. Managed Accounts
One hedge fund structure that may reflect an optimal governance arrange-
ment for some investors is a managed account. A managed account is a structure in
which an investor retains full ownership of its funds and hires the fund manager to
invest the funds as a third party.326 In a managed account, it is the responsibility of
the investor to hire independent third-party service providers and undertake the ac-
count's operations (such as risk management and reporting).327 Managed accounts
have become increasingly popular with investors since the financial crisis of 2008.328
The benefits of managed accounts relative to traditional hedge fund struc-
tures are that managed accounts give investors greater transparency (providing as
much as real-time, position-level transparency), at least some degree of direct control
over how the assets are managed, a high degree of liquidity, and greater control over
how fees and taxes are allocated.329 Managed accounts, however, have several disad-
324 See QUIRK & BANK OF N.Y. MELLON, supra note 2, at 30-31.
325 See generally Rajna Gibson & Songtao Wong, Hedge Fund Alphas: Do They Reflect Managerial
Skills or Mere Compensation for Liquidity Risk Bearing? (Swiss Fin. Inst., Research Paper No. 08-37,
2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1304541.
326 MOODY'S INVESTOR SERV., HEDGE FUNDS: INVESTING THROUGH MANAGED AcCOUNTS 2 (2010),
available at http://www.opalesque.com/files/MoodysHedgeFundsMACs-May2O I 0.pdf.
327 PETER DoM & JASPER HAAK, AF ADVISORS, MANAGED ACCOUNTS: THE ANSWER TO THE TREND
OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN HEDGE FUND INVESTING? 22 (2012).
328 TOWERS WATSON, HEDGE FUND INVESTING: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 6 (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-
Results/2012/04/Hedge-Fund-investing-opportunities-and-challenges.
329 Victor L. Zimmerman et al., An Investment Decision for the New Economic Reality: Hedge
Funds or Discretionary Managed Accounts?, ALT. INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT, Mar. 2009, at 25, 27. See
also ADVENT SOFTWARE & MAPLES FUND SERVS., ALTERNATIVE MANAGED ACCOUNTS: OPPORTUNITIES
IN FUND ADMINISTRATION 4 (2010), available at
http://www.maplesfundservices.com/sites/default/files/Managed%20Accounts%2OWhite%2Paper/ 20
10.5.pdf; TOWERS WATSON, supra note 328, at 7-8; Focus on Managed Accounts, HFMWEEK, Sept. 27-
Oct. 3, 2012, at 30.
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vantages. One disadvantage is higher administrative costs, which necessarily arise
from establishing and operating numerous distinct accounts. 33 0 Managed accounts al-
so limit access to certain investment strategies, such as those that invest in hard-to-
value illiquid assets making it difficult to allocate the positions across different ac-
counts. 33 1 Managed accounts may also suffer from an agency cost in the form of ad-
verse selection. Because managed accounts are a structure with governance devices
very much in the investor's favor, the most sought-after or skilled managers are gen-
erally not willing to accede to their terms.3 32 Accordingly, investors may fail to dif-
ferentiate the quality of managed account providers. Investors in managed accounts
also have a higher monitoring burden to ensure that the manager does not stray from
its strategy, does not favor the funds it manages over its managed accounts, and ade-
quately shadows any underlying fund it is meant to track.33 3 Finally, managed ac-
counts also lack co-investment by managers,33 4 which is an important governance de-
vice and underlies managers' high pay-performance sensitivity.
The disadvantages of managed accounts reflect the inherent limitations in-
vestors face when they attempt to obtain investor-friendly governance. Indeed, the
limitations on managed accounts are precisely the reason why hedge fund investors
may be better off with less disclosures, higher fees, and less access to their capital.
Agreeing to those terms has its own set of disadvantages, but it has the benefit of al-
lowing investors to access a wider variety of hedge fund strategies and, more likely,
higher skilled managers.
Conclusion
Hedge fund governance consists of the funds' underlying legal regime and
the practices they adopt in response to lacking permanent capital and to reduce agen-
cy costs. The analysis in this Article suggests that hedge fund governance devices are
generally successful in disciplining and incentivizing managers to generate valuable
risk-adjusted returns for investors. Nonetheless, investors should seek to improve
hedge fund governance by striking the right balance between governance devices that
empower managers and those that provide investor protection. Although lower fees,
greater liquidity, and more disclosures may generally improve governance and re-
330 TOWERS WATSON, supra note 328, at 8-9.
13 Id. at 8.
332 id.
333 MooDY'S INVESTOR SERV., supra note 326, at 6.
334 TOWERS WATSON, supra note 328, at 8.
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turns, investors should take a measured approach in negotiating for such outcomes.
Indeed, investors may benefit from less disclosure, higher fees, and less access to
their capital.
With respect to fees, investors should seek relatively low management fees in
particularly large funds to prevent paying substantial non-performance-based fees to
managers that go above their operating costs. Lower performance fees, on the other
hand, may reduce the incentives of managers to perform well and reduce the ability
of a fund to attract skilled managers. Greater use of performance fees calculated over
a multi-year period is likely an area where governance can be substantially improved.
Investors also should not always attempt to negotiate greater redemption
rights. Instead, investors should focus on performance fees and liquidity terms match-
ing the time horizon of the manager's investment strategy, so managers are paid
when actual investment gains are realized and investors do not withdraw their capital
until the strategy has been implemented. Redemption rights will also matter less as
secondary markets for hedge fund shares develop. Investors should also question the
use of high-water marks and hurdle rates in certain contexts and attempt to have a
manager invest a substantial portion of its own wealth, and a portion of fund profits,
in the funds they manage.
In terms of transparency, real-time, position-level transparency may do little
to produce more valuable information for investors. Such a high level of transparency
may, however, unduly burden managers and reduce their competitive advantage.
More important than real-time, position-level transparency is transparency about the
strength of a hedge fund's operational controls and the correlation of the fund's re-
turns with stock and credit markets. Investors should also not pressure hedge funds to
adopt boards or increase their reliance on, or expectations of, existing fund directors.
Hedge fund investors should instead pressure managers to establish proper internal
committees and rely more on administrators and other third-party service providers to
serve as an independent check, especially in the area of performance reporting and
valuation. To the extent boards are relied on, equity-based compensation for directors
may make them more effective.
In providing the first scholarly analysis of the internal governance of hedge
funds, this Article establishes a framework for future research. It identifies the prima-
ry types of hedge fund agency costs and governance devices and the various choices
that managers and investors face in attempting strike the right balance between man-
agerialism and investor-responsiveness.
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